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TAKING THE COP OUT OF COPPING A PLEA:
ERADICATING POLICE PROSECUTION OF
CRIMINAL CASES
Andrew Horwitz*

I. INTRODUCTION
A criminal prosecutor in the American legal system is vested with an
enormous amount of discretion in the handling of a criminal case.1 In the vast
majority of situations, that discretion is exercised at early stages in a prosecution in
ways that cannot and will not ever be reviewed, either by the judiciary or by
anyone else.2 Most obviously, the basic decision to charge a person with a crime
and the secondary decision of what charge or charges to file are almost entirely
beyond any form of review.3 Any of a multitude of pre-trial decisions, including
bail requests, discovery, and plea negotiations, are similarly outside the scope of
*
Associate Professor and Director of the Criminal Defense Clinic, Roger
Williams University School of Law. B.A. 1983, Haverford College; J.D. 1986, New York
University School of Law. I would like to thank my colleagues, Professors Edward Eberle,
Diana Hassel, Michael Yelnosky, and David Zlotnick, for their insightful comments on an
earlier draft of this Article. Sylvia Josh, Humberta Goncalves, and Mary Lotuff provided
able research assistance, and the Roger Williams University School of Law provided greatly
appreciated financial support for this project. I would also like to thank my children, Daniel
and Catherine, for some much-needed distraction and comic relief, and my wife, Alexandra
K. Callam, for her love and support.
1.
See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); Pugach v.

Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL,
CRwnNALPROCEDURE § 13.2(a) (2d ed. 1992).
LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 13.2(g).
2.

3.
The United States Supreme Court has noted that "so long as the prosecutor
has probable cause to believe that the accused has committed an offense defined by statute,
the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file.. .generally rests entirely in
his discretion." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). See also Joan E. Jacoby,
The American Prosecutor'sDiscretionaryPower, THE PROSECUTOR, Nov.-Dec. 1997, at
25, 25 (describing the prosecutor's "unreviewable authority to bring charges or dismiss
them"). The only recognized limitations on prosecutorial discretion at the charging stage
involve selective prosecution claims based on protected classifications or on the exercise of
statutory or constitutional rights. Bordenkircher,434 U.S. at 364; Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608.
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any effective review.4 The United States Supreme Court has noted that most
prosecutorial decisions do not lend themselves readily to judicial review and,
except for some very narrow exceptions, should remain beyond the scope of
judicial review for broader policy reasons.' Consequently, the criminal justice
system functions largely on a tremendous leap of faith that those who wield the
government's prosecutorial power will wield it in a fair and just fashion. In large
part, this leap of faith is justified by the prosecutor's legal training, by the
prosecutor's oath of obedience to a binding code of legal ethics, and by the fact
that the prosecutor, at least on the state level, is an elected official who is expected
to be responsive to the electorate.
Despite those justifications, a surprising number of jurisdictions in the
United States entrust the prosecution of criminal cases to police officers who are
not licensed to practice law, who are not obligated to follow a legal code of ethics,
and who have no particular obligation to be responsive to the electorate. The
prosecution of criminal cases by police officers is a widespread practice in the
lower state courts in this country. In one national survey published in 1981, twelve
percent of the judges sitting in misdemeanor criminal courts indicated that a
prosecuting attorney "infrequently" or "never" conducted the trial of misdemeanor
defendants.' In those state cases in which a prosecuting attorney did not appear at
the trial, the charges were prosecuted by a police officer seventy-five percent of the
time, with the arresting officer handling the overwhelming majority of the cases.'
There is also evidence that the police prosecution of misdemeanor offenses before
federal magistrates in various United States Magistrates Courts is a relatively
common practice.8
In only two of the many states in which police prosecute misdemeanor
cases-South Carolina and New Hampshire-have the highest courts specifically
ruled on and endorsed the practice, in each case finding that a police officer who
prosecutes a criminal case is somehow not engaged in the practice of law.9 In three
other states-Massachusetts, Maine, and Iowa-police prosecution is arguably

4.
See, e.g., Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S. 787, 807
(1987); Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 713 (4th Cir. 1967).
5.
See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607-08.
6.
NATIONAL INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., MISDEMEANOR COURTS:
POLICY CONCERNS AND RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES B-15 (1981) [hereinafter MISDEMEANOR
COURTS].
Id. at B-16. Eighty percent of the cases that were prosecuted by police
7.
officers were reportedly prosecuted by the arresting officer in the case. Id.
8.
See United States v. Glover, 381 F. Supp. 1139, 1143 (D. Md. 1974)
(upholding a misdemeanor conviction after trial at which a sergeant in the United States Air
Force acted as prosecutor, noting that "allowing [an officer] to act, in effect, as a prosecutor,
has long had the tacit approval of all of the Judges of this Court"). See also United States v.
Broers, 776 F.2d 1424 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding a misdemeanor conviction after a trial at
which an agent of the United States Forest Service acted as prosecutor); United States v.
Downin, 884 F. Supp. 1474 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (same).
9.
For a full discussion of these cases, see infra notes 135-79 and
accompanying text.
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authorized by statute, either directly or by implication. l In the federal system, the
practice of police prosecution exists without any statutory authority and has been
the subject of appellate review in only three published cases.' In the majority of
jurisdictions in which police prosecution is common, the legality and wisdom of
the practice has never been directly considered in any published court decision,
despite the fact that it is not authorized by statute and appears to fly in"the face of
court rules and statutes prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law. Because
police prosecution exists in many jurisdictions with little or no legal authority, and
because of the large numbers of defendants who have been prosecuted in this
fashion, the fact that the practice has rarely been the subject of appellate review
and has never been the subject of scholarly commentary 2 is quite extraordinary.
This Article represents an effort to remedy, at least in part, this lack of attention to
an extremely troubling practice.
Part II of this Article will lay the groundwork for the argument that police
officers who are not licensed attorneys should not be allowed to prosecute criminal
cases, exploring some of the dangers that arise when a prosecutor is not trained as a
lawyer and is not bound by a code of legal ethics. Part III of this Article will
describe in more detail the extent to which the practice of police prosecution is
prevalent in various jurisdictions in this country and the legal support, if any, that
can be found for it. Part IV of this Article will examine the legal challenges that a
criminal defendant might raise if he or she is prosecuted by a police officer who is
not licensed to practice law. Part V of this Article will examine some of the
broader public policy arguments against the practice of police prosecution.

IX. PROBLEMS ARISING FROM POLICE PROSECUTION
OF CRIMINAL CASES
A prosecutor 3 has extremely broad and almost totally unreviewable
discretion at virtually every stage in a criminal prosecution, from the filing of
charges all the way through to the ultimate resolution of the case.'4 Each stage of
the process involves innumerable decisions, each of which relies on a balancing of
any number of factors. In order for the criminal justice system to function as
envisioned, it is Vital that the key decision maker-the prosecutor-exercise
For a full discussion of these statutes, see infra notes 215-29 and
10.
accompanying text.
See infra notes 204-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases cited
11.
supra note 8.
This author's research has not disclosed a single law review article that
12.
directly addresses the practice of police prosecution of criminal cases.
The term "prosecutor" will be used throughout this Article to refer to any
13.
individual "who prosecutes another for a crime in the name of the government." BLACK'S
LAW DIcTIONARY 1221 (6th ed. 1990). On occasion, as should be clear from the context, the
term may also be used to describe the office of the public prosecutor. When there is a need
to distinguish between a duly licensed attorney in the role of prosecutor and an unlicensed
police officer in that role, the former will be referenced as a "prosecuting attorney" and the
latter as a "police prosecutor."
See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
14.
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discretion based upon a firm foundation in and understanding of a variety of legal
principles. Early on in our country's history, the states and the federal government
moved away from the private prosecution of crimes and toward the election of
public prosecutors, based primarily on the belief that an independent, well-trained
prosecutor will guard the process against all forms of abuse.' 5 In order to have
some assurance that the vast prosecutorial power will be wielded by someone who
is competent to wield it, every state now employs a public prosecutor and requires
the public prosecutor to be an attorney duly licensed to practice in that
jurisdiction. 6 Given the recognition of the need for protection from abuse inherent
in each of those movements, it is truly surprising how many jurisdictions allow the
overwhelming bulk of prosecutorial discretion to be exercised by police officers
who are neither trained as lawyers nor admitted to practice law.
Moving beyond issues of basic legal competence, there are significant
ethical issues that arise throughout the prosecution of a criminal case. A prosecutor
is entrusted to act as a minister of justice, seeking not merely to convict the guilty,
but also to protect the innocent and to protect the integrity of the criminal justice
system.' 7 Consequently, it is vital that a prosecutor exercise his or her vast
discretion within the constraints of legal ethics. The presumption that the
prosecutor both understands and will obey the applicable legal ethical provisions
derives from the taking and passing of both a bar examination and the Multistate
Professional Responsibility Examination, from an investigation into the attorney's
character and fitness to practice law conducted by the state's legal licensing board,
and from the attorney's sworn obedience to legal ethics. While the appropriate
exercise of prosecutorial discretion is dependent upon far more than the
observation of minimum legal ethical standards," there are some basic
prosecutorial attributes that are notoriously absent when the prosecutor is not a
licensed attorney: legal education and training concerning the ethical rules that
govern the prosecution of a criminal case, and an expressed commitment, enforced
by the disciplinary process, to abide by those ethical rules in their daily activities. 9
15.
See Andrew Sidman, Note, The Outmoded Concept of Private Prosecution,
25 AM. U. L. REv. 754, 762-65 (1976).
16.
Id. at 764.
17.
See, e.g., MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. (3d ed.
1996) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSiBlIrY EC 7-13
(1981) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]; AMERICAN BAR Assoc., A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 3-1.2(c) (3d

ed. 1993) [hereinafter A.B.A. PRosEcUrION STANDARDS].

18.
Indeed, as is argued in Part V of this Article, a prosecutor plays an extremely
significant role in determining public policy with respect to the enforcement of criminal
laws. It is widely recognized that a prosecutor can and must make frequent decisions not to
prosecute even in the face of sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause.
Professors LaFave and Israel, in their leading criminal procedure treatise, catalogue a
number of reasons that a prosecutor might elect not to prosecute, including legislative
overcriminalization, limitations on prosecutorial resources, and the need to individualize
justice. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 13.2(a).

By 1997, thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia had adopted some
19.
version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, thereby subjecting attorneys who
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This section of the Article will explore the ways in which legal
competence and ethical rules and guidelines predominate throughout the criminal
justice process, describing some of the many ways in which the injection of a
police prosecutor may be detrimental to the fair administration of the criminal law.
A. The Decision to Chargea Crime
Few areas of prosecutorial discretion are as important and as subject to
abuse, whether by vindictiveness, favoritism, or sheer incompetence, as the
decision of whether or not to charge an individual with a crime.' Legal
competence is, of course, absolutely essential at the charging stage of a criminal
case if the criminal justice system is to function in a fair and just manner. In the
most basic sense, we count on a prosecutor to screen out cases prior to filing
charges in order to eliminate cases that are not supported by sufficient evidence. At
least two levels of legal expertise are required in order for a prosecutor to make
that decision appropriately. First, of the evidence that has been gathered, which
pieces will or will not be admissible at a trial?2 A strong working knowledge of the
various laws concerning the suppression of unlawfully seized evidence, as well as
of the rules of evidence, is a necessary prerequisite to a proper evaluation
concerning admissibility. Second, is the legally admissible evidence sufficient to
justify a criminal charge?' A strong legal knowledge of the elements of any given
practice in those jurisdictions to the imposition of discipline for the failure to abide by its
terms. Most of the remaining states continue to follow some version of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, with a similar disciplinary enforcement mechanism in place. By
contrast, the A.B.A. Prosecution Function Standards are aspirational in nature, intended to
"provide prosecutors with reasoned and appropriate advice" and to "serve as a guide to
what is deemed to be proper conduct." A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17,
Standard 3-1.1 cmt. The Standards "are not intended ...to serve as rules to be used as the
basis for the imposition of professional discipline; applicable codes of ethics adopted in
each jurisdiction serve that function." Id.
20.
In his leading article on prosecutorial discretion, Professor Wayne R. LaFave
identified the charging decision as "that part of the prosecutor's discretion which carries
with it the greatest potential for misuse." Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor'sDiscretionin
the United States, 18 AM. J. CoMP. L. 532, 537 (1970).

Both the American Bar Association and the National District Attorneys
21.
Association have incorporated this obvious proposition into their standards for how
prosecutors should proceed. See A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard
3-3.9(a) ("A prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the continued
pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to support a
conviction.") (emphasis added); NATIONAL DISTRICT AT'Ys Assoc., NATIONAL
PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 43.3 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter NDAA PROSECUTION
STANDARDS] ("A prosecutor should file only those charges which he reasonably believes
can be substantiated by admissible evioence at trial.") (emphasis added).
22.
Again, this obvious proposition is reflected in the relevant sources that serve
to guide a prosecutor's behavior. See MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 3.8(a) ("A
prosecutor shall refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not
supported by probable cause."); MODEL CODE, supra note 17, DR 7-103(A) ("A public
prosecutor.. .shall not institute.. .criminal charges when he knows or it is obvious that the
charges are not supportable by probable cause."); A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra
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offense is a prerequisite here, as is a solid understanding of what does and does not
constitute probable cause and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The erroneous decision to charge a person with a crime that is not
supported by sufficient evidence, while potentially remediable through the criminal
justice system with either an acquittal after trial or the eventual dismissal of the
charges, can have a devastating impact on the individual's life.' On the other hand,
at least an erroneous decision to charge is to some extent remediable. Perhaps of
even more concern to the interests of society is the erroneous failure to charge a
person with a crime based upon a mistaken belief that the conduct alleged is not
criminal or that the evidence is legally insufficient; that kind of error, because it
will never be discovered, can never be remedied through the system, leaving
society completely unprotected at the hands of the incompetent prosecutor. If
incompetence causes a police prosecutor to overlook or discount admissible
evidence, or to misapprehend the elements of an offense and the proof necessary
for a conviction, a wrongdoer may benefit at the expense of justice.
The fact that a prosecuting attorney is bound by a code of ethics can play
an enormous role in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion at the charging stage.
First and foremost, a prosecuting attorney is expected to "seek justice"'24 and is
prohibited from using the criminal process to further some interest other than the
legitimate prosecution of criminal charges.' While there may be a whole host of
reasons why a prosecutor might want to file charges against a particular individual
or refrain from filing,2 6 an attorney is bound to exercise his or her charging
discretion based only on legally permissible factors.27 For example, a prosecutor's
personal relationship with an individual, whether hostile or friendly, should play no
note 17, Standard 3-3.9(a) ("A prosecutor should not institute, or cause to be instituted, or
permit the continued pendency of criminal charges when the prosecutor knows that the
charges are not supported by probable cause.").
23.
See, e.g., Young v. United States ex reL Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S. 787, 814
(1987) ('Even if a defendant is ultimately acquitted, forced immersion in criminal
investigation and adjudication is a wrenching disruption of everyday life.").
24.
A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-1.2. See also
MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 3.8 cmt. ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a
minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.").
25.
See, e.g., A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-3.9(d)
("'n making the decision to prosecute, the prosecutor should give no weight to the personal
or political advantages or disadvantages which might be involved or to a desire to enhance
his or her record of convictions."); Standard 3-1.3(0 ("A prosecutor should not permit his
or her professional judgment or obligations to be affected by his or her own political,
financial, business, property, or personal interests."); NDAA PROSECUTION STANDARDS,
supra note 21, Standard 42.4 (providing that a prosecutor should not consider his or her
"rate of conviction" or any "[p]ersonal advantages" or "[plolitical advantages" that may
result from the prosecution of the case).
26.
The ethical rules cited in the previous footnote make specific reference to
some of the more common inappropriate reasons that a prosecutor might wish to prosecute
or refrain from prosecution, including personal, professional, and political advantage or
disadvantage.
27.
See supra note 25.
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role in the charging decision.28 A prosecutor's desire to keep illegal or
unconstitutional police conduct from being revealed, or to shield a police officer or
department from the prospect of civil liability, must not enter into the prosecutorial
decision of whether to charge an individual with a crime. 29 A prosecutor's desire to
enhance his or her professional standing or to improve his or her chances for
promotion must likewise be kept out of the charging decision. ° While each of
these factors almost certainly enters into many charging decisions made by
prosecuting attorneys, at least the public and the putative defendant enjoy some
protection from the ethical prohibitions against such conduct.
When a charging decision is made by a police officer who is not an
attorney, the protection offered by the legal ethical rules is completely absent.
While attorneys are bound by various rules concerning conflicts of interest, there
seems to be virtually no prohibition against the police abuse of the power to
charge. Certainly, a person charged with a crime without sufficient evidence may
eventually get those charges dismissed and may pursue an action based on a claim
of malicious prosecution. Such suits are very difficult to win and do not truly
restore a person to the status that person may have enjoyed prior to the filing of the
charges. A defendant would have legal recourse if a decision to charge could be
proved to have been made in violation of the equal protection clause, as for
example if the defendant were charged because of his or her race,3 ' but such
litigation is virtually never successful. 32 Cases in which the evidence is legally
sufficient but that are prosecuted purely out of bias, personal animus, or some other
inappropriate consideration, are much harder to address. There appears to be no
legal sanction that can be imposed on a police officer, and the system does a very

28.

See supra note 25.

29.
See supra note 25. A number of cases have explicitly stated that it is
unethical for a prosecutor to prosecute a case in order to attempt to shield a police officer or
department from civil liability. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Musick, 425 F.2d 373, 375 (9th Cir.
1970) (noting that "[ilt is no part of the proper duty of a prosecutor to use a criminal
prosecution to forestall a civil proceeding by the defendant against policemen, even where
the civil case arises from the events that are also the basis for the criminal charge"); Boyd v.
Adams, 513 F.2d 83, 89 (7th Cir. 1975) (quoting language from MacDonaldv. Musick with
approval); Gray v. City of Galesburg, 247 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976) (quoting
Boyd v. Adams, 513 F.2d at 89). The Model Code of Professional Responsibility expressly
prohibits an attorney from presenting, participating in presenting, or threatening "to present
criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter." MODEL CODE, supra note
17, DR 7-105(A). See also NDAA PROsEcUTION STANDARDS, supra note 21, Standard 43.5

(providing that a prosecutor "should not file charges for the purpose of obtaining from a
defendant a release of potential civil claims"). For a thorough discussion of the ethical
issues involved when a prosecutor seeks to use the criminal process to protect the civil
interests of the police, see James A. Trowbridge, Restraining the Prosecutor:Restrictions
on ThreateningProsecutionfor Civil Ends, 37 ME. L. REv. 41, 57-62 (1985).
30.
See supra note 25.
31.
See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985); United States v.

Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448,456 (1962).
32.

LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 13A(b).
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poor job of reviewing those types of discretionary decisions.33 Most acute,
however, is the complete lack of protection for the public when its interests, rather
than those of the accused, are not protected.
It is clear that a police prosecutor is much more likely to be subject to
certain kinds of institutional biases than is a prosecuting attorney. Several examples
should serve to clarify the point. The arresting officer in a criminal case, who in
many jurisdictions is also the prosecuting officer, may be in some jeopardy
concerning allegations of police brutality, false arrest, or various other violations of
an individual's rights. One way of providing greater protection for the officer is to
be sure that criminal charges are filed, because a case that never makes it through
the charging stage puts the officer in a much worse posture in terms of civil or
criminal litigation.' Indeed, a significant body of literature suggests that police
officers commonly file charges that are largely or entirely untrue in order to try to
insulate themselves from such allegations.3" Another way of providing that kind of
protection is to secure an agreement from the individual that he or she will not file
civil charges in exchange for an agreement not to charge him or her with a crime.36
While some courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have enforced
these sorts of waiver agreements under certain circumstances,37 there are significant
ethical restraints upon an attorney considering such an agreement.38 Whether
charges are filed or not filed for these purposes, the public is poorly served by the
injection of these issues into the decision of whether or not to prosecute.
33.
As indicated elsewhere in this Article, the United States Supreme Court has
declared that the decision to charge is particularly ill suited to judicial supervision or
review. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.

34.
See, e.g., Lynch v. City of Alhambra, 880 F.2d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 1989)
(noting that an arresting officer who "may have used excessive force in effecting an arrest,"
simply because he or she is "facing potential civil liability, has every incentive to arrest on a
marginal or nonexistent violation, and push for a charge and release").
See, e.g., PAUL CHEviGNY, Pouic. POWER: POLICE ABusEs IN NEW YoRK
35.
Crry 143 (1969); Stanley Z. Fisher, "Just the Facts, Ma'am": Lying and the Omission of
Exculpatory Evidence in Police Reports, 28 NEw ENG. L. Rv. 1, 15 (1993); Lawrence
Sherman, Learning PoliceEthics, CplM. JusT. ETHICs, Winter/Spring 1982, at 10, 15.

36.
This sort of an arrangement, often referred to as a "release-dismissal
agreement," when entered into by a prosecuting attorney, raises any number of thorny
ethical issues. While a five to four majority of the United States Supreme Court in 1987
refused to hold that release-dismissal agreements are per se void as against public policy, it
acknowledged that such agreements might "tempt prosecutors to bring frivolous charges, or
to dismiss meritorious charges, to protect the interests of other officials." Town of Newton
v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 395 (1987). Despite the concerns that it expressed, the Court
adopted a case-by-case analysis for assessing the validity of waiver agreements. Id. at 397.
Numerous lower courts have found that such agreements are unenforceable and that an
attorney is ethically prohibited from entering into such an agreement. See cases cited supra
note 29. Even if an agreement to forgo civil litigation in a particular case would be legally
unenforceable, the mere fact that a defendant has signed such an agreement would prevent
most defendants from even considering future litigation.
37.
See, e.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987); Bushnell v.
Rossetti, 750 F.2d 298 (4th Cir. 1984).
38.

See supra note 29.
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Institutional bias also arises in terms of the prosecuting officer's
relationships with his or her fellow officers. If the prosecuting officer were to
recognize that some evidence was gathered in an illegal fashion, there would be an
enormous disincentive for the officer to acknowledge the illegality, particularly if it
meant refusing to file charges. Not only would the prosecuting officer risk
engendering tremendous resentment from an officer upon whom he or she is likely
to have to rely in the future, but the prosecuting officer also risks setting up a
colleague for the possibility of internal review or potential litigation. This sort of
behavior violates what has frequently been described as one of the central maxims
of police culture: protect your fellow officers at all costs.39 The far easier path is to
charge the individual and then use the prosecutorial power to resolve it quickly.
Yet another form of bias arises when the "victim" of the alleged crime is a
police officer or the police department. Certainly an officer who has arrested
someone for assaulting him or her or resisting arrest, even if the charge is
legitimate, is not likely to view a case in the same fashion as would'an attorney
without any personal connection to the case.' While a prosecuting attorney must
4
recuse himself or herself from a case in which he or she has a conflict of interest, '
a police prosecutor is not bound by any similar rule. A defendant who has been
charged with a crime may try to raise some due process issues surrounding the
prosecutor's conflict of interest, 42 but the defendant will have already been harmed
in the sense that the charges have already been filed.
One last form of institutional bias arises due to the differing levels of
immunity that attach to prosecuting attorneys and police officers. In Imbler v.
Pachtman,43 the United States Supreme Court held that prosecuting attorneys, who
had traditionally enjoyed absolute immunity from civil liability at common law for
acts performed within the scope of their official duties, would also have absolute
immunity from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .44 The Court noted that "[t]he
function of a prosecutor that most often invites a common-law tort action is his
decision to initiate a prosecution, as this may lead to a suit for malicious
prosecution if the State's case misfires."'45 The Court then detailed a number of
hazards that anything short of absolute immunity would create. Primarily, the Court
suggested that a prosecutor's exercise of discretion would be inappropriately
39.
See Sherman, supra note 35, at 15.
40.
Id. at 14 (suggesting that one of the primary values that police officers are
taught is that "[d]isrespect for police authority is a serious offense that should always be
punished with an arrest or the use of force").
41.
See A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-1.3(a) ("A
prosecutor should avoid a conflict of interest with respect to his or her official duties.");
NDAA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 21, Standards 7.1-7.3.
42.
A number of cases have addressed a defendant's due process right not to be
prosecuted by a prosecutor who suffers from a conflict of interest. See, e.g., Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. United States, 411 F.2d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 1969);
Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967); Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 22
(Va. 1985).
43.
424 U.S. 409 (1976).
44.
Id. at 427.
45.
Id. at 421.
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altered "if he were constrained in making every decision by the consequences in
terms of his own potential liability in a suit for damages. 46 Furthermore, the Court
suggested that "a prosecutor understandably would be reluctant to go forward with
a close case where an acquittal likely would trigger a suit against him for
damages."'47 Because even the threat of litigation could result in those problems,
the Court held that any form of qualified immunity would be insufficient to protect
the public good.
In contrast, the Supreme Court held in Piersonv. Ray48 that police officers
would enjoy the benefit of a "defense of good faith and probable cause" to actions
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, similar to the protection that police officers enjoyed at
common law.49 As the Court went to great lengths to point out in Imbler, there is a
world of difference for the potential civil litigation defendant between absolute
immunity, which stops a law suit prior to the discovery stage, and this form of
qualified immunity, which relies on the proof of factual issues at a trial."0 Thus, all
of the fears and concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in Imbler are very much
alive and well in the arena of police prosecutions.
B. The Decision of What to Charge
Much like in the area of whether or not to file charges at all, discietion in
the area of what charges to file is extraordinarily broad and subject to very limited
review. Because the overcharging or undercharging of a criminal case can have
extremely serious consequences for the accused and for society,5' issues of
competence and legal training loom large. A police officer who is not an attorney
cannot be expected to navigate the series of complex legal and strategic decisions
that can enter into the charging decision in an appropriate fashion.52
Once a prosecutor has decided to file charges, he or she may have a broad
range of criminal charges from which to choose. Many forms of criminal behavior
46.
Id. at 424-25.
47.
Id. at 426 n.24.
48.
386 U.S. 547 (1967).
49.
Id. at 557. There is no reason to believe that the Court, in deciding either
Imbler or Pierson,ever contemplated a situation in which a police officer was acting as a
prosecutor. While it is conceivable that a court could apply the rule announced in Imbler to
a police prosecutor, the Court's heavy reliance in Imbler on a prosecutor's "amenability to
professional discipline," Imbler, 424 U.S. at 429, would render that application both
inappropriate and highly unlikely.
50.
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424-26.
51.
See NDAA PROSECurION STANDARDS, supra note 21, Standard 43 cmt.
("The selection of a particular charge will have an important bearing upon the conduct of
the criminal proceedings.").
52.
The National District Attorneys Association has determined that the decision
concerning what charges to file must be "the prerogative and the responsibility of the
prosecutor." NDAA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 21, Standard 43 cmt. The
Standards emphasize that the "[a]pplication of the prosecutor's determination to any
specific situation involves a complex charging decision" in which any number of legal and
non-legal factors must be weighed. Id.
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constitute the violation of several criminal statutes at once. 3 Deciding which crime
or crimes to charge requires a detailed knowledge not only of the elements of each
offense, but also of the rules of evidence, of any potential suppression issues, and
of the various potential legal defenses to each crime. Whether or not to charge a
defendant with lesser included offenses is a tricky strategic decision that requires a
great deal of litigation expertise. In the absence of legal training that is sufficient to
make proper charging decisions, a police officer is most likely to err on the side of
overcharging, assuming that this is the safer course for him or her to take. 4 The
nature of the crime or crimes charged inevitably has an enormous impact on the
manner in which the case will be handled in court, including whether or not bail
will be set, whether or not counsel will necessarily be assigned if the defendant is
indigent,5 s and whether the case will be handled in a specialized lower court or in a
court of general jurisdiction. As such, the decisions that a prosecutor makes at the
outset about what level of crime to charge may be among the most important
decisions that a prosecutor makes in a case.
Ethical standards can play a significant role in the proper determination of
criminal charges. While a prosecuting attorney is ethically prohibited from
overcharging a case in order to gain strategic advantage, 6 there does not appear to
be any prohibition against a police prosecutor engaging in the very same conduct.
53.

See A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-3.9 cmt.

('The structure of the substantive law of crimes is such that a single criminal event will
often give rise to potential criminal liability for a number of different crimes."). A common
example in the misdemeanor setting would involve a hostile interaction between a
defendant and a police officer from which could derive any or all of the following charges:
disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, obstruction of'justice, and assault on a police officer.
54.
In his leading article on plea bargaining, Albert W. Alschuler noted that
police officers and prosecuting attorneys share this motivation for overcharging. Albert W.
Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole in Plea Bargaining,36 U. Cm. L. Rav. 50, 93 (1968). He

went on to explain, however, that a police officer's motivation to "play it safe," stemming as
it does from the fact that an officer is "not usually versed in the subtleties of the law," can
lead to "charges thit even prosecutors regard as extravagant." Id.
55.
While a person who is charged with a felony has a federal constitutional
right to appointed counsel if he or she cannot afford private representation, Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), a person who is charged with a misdemeanor has a
federal constitutional right to appointed counsel only if he or she is ultimately sentenced to
a term of imprisonment. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
56.

See NDAA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 21, Standard 43.4 ('The

prosecutor should not attempt to utilize the charging decision only as a leverage device in
obtaining guilty pleas to lesser charges."); A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17,

Standard 3-3.9(f) ('The prosecutor should not bring or seek charges greater in number or
degree than can reasonably be supported with evidence at trial or than are necessary to fairly
reflect the gravity of the offense."). As the A.B.A. Standards point out:
The line separating overcharging from the sound exercise of
prosecutorial discretion is necessarily a subjective one, but the key
consideration is the prosecutor's commitment to the interests of justice,
fairly bringing those charges he or she believes are supported by the
facts without "piling on" charges in order to unduly leverage an accused
to forgo his or her right to trial.
A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-3.9 cmt.
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Because the charges filed establish the outer limits of a defendant's potential
criminal liability, they provide the framework for any negotiation that follows;
thus, a defendant may be placed at an extraordinary strategic disadvantage if a
police prosecutor has overcharged the case, a fact that would not be lost on a
seasoned police officer.
A prosecuting officer may have some other agenda in the determination of
the charge or charges to be filed. Overcharging may serve as the best protection
from either litigation or internal review concerning allegations of brutality, false
arrest, or the invasion of other rights. Overcharging may also serve to further an
officer's personal agenda concerning a particular case or an officer's quest for
promotion within the department. Undercharging may similarly serve an officer's
personal agenda concerning a particular case. There do not appear to be any rules
that would prohibit a prosecuting officer from exercising his or her charging
discretion in an abusive fashion, other than the minimal legal protection offered to
a defendant who can prove that the abuse took the form of some kind of equal
protection violation.' As noted earlier, a prosecutor's charging decisions are
almost totally unreviewed and almost completely unreviewable;58 as a
consequence, society is left virtually unprotected from the acts of an unscrupulous
police prosecutor.
C. Discovery and Disclosure
One of the cornerstones of fairness in the criminal justice system is the
requirement that information, and, in particular, exculpatory information, be
disclosed to the accused. Local statutes and rules generally govern when and what
a prosecuting attorney must provide to an accused by way of discovery. Since it is
ordinarily presumed that the discovery process will be handled by a prosecuting
attorney, these statutes and rules do not tend to impose any discovery obligations
directly upon the police. Even if one assumes that the rules can and should be
applied to a police prosecutor, a police prosecutor is likely to encounter significant
difficulty in formulating the proper legal interpretation of the statutes and rules.
What is and is not discoverable can sometimes be a complex inquiry requiring
significant legal expertise that a police officer would generally lack.
Legal rules concerning discovery in criminal cases generally include a
variety of categories of evidence that must be turned over to the defendant. At a
minimum, the prosecutor is generally required to determine what is and is not
"relevant" to the case. An erroneous prosecutorial decision regarding relevance can
have serious consequences. Too little discovery is obviously of serious concern to
a defendant, and while there are some judicial remedies available, they tend to
relate only to cases that actually proceeded to trid 59 and are, for that reason, clearly
too little, too late for most defendants. When there is a judicial remedy available,
there is an enormous cost in terms of'judicial resources when the remedy involves a

57.
58.
59.

See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 2-5.
See generally LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 20.6(b).
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new trial. Too much discovery can also be a concern, primarily in its failure to
provide adequate protection for prosecution witnesses.'
In the area of exculpatory evidence, the complexity of the legal issues is
of much greater concern when disclosure is entrusted to a police officer.
Determining whether the disclosure of a particular piece of evidence is
61
constitutionally required under the leading United States Supreme Court cases
can be a complicated endeavor. Indeed, several courts have noted the difficulty that
can arise in determining whether evidence qualifies as exculpatory or, more
commonly, whether evidence qualifies as material to the case.62 Expecting an
untrained police officer to exercise this kind of complex legal judgment is entirely
unrealistic. Moreover, it is not at all clear that the constitutional obligation to
disclose exculpatory evidence to the defendant would extend to a police
prosecutor.63 Quite obviously, the consequences of the failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence can be devastating, not only for the defendant who may be
wrongly convicted, but also for society, which may be left unprotected from the
truly culpable criminal who goes unprosecuted.
A defendant has very limited legal recourse when a prosecutor fails to
disclose exculpatory evidence. Obviously, and most importantly, the defendant can
never pursue a legal recourse unless the exculpatory evidence somehow comes to
his or her attention, which is highly unlikely in most circumstances.' Even if a
The American Bar Association specifically recognized, in drafting Rule 3.8
60.
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, that under certain circumstances the
"disclosure of information to the defense c[an] result in substantial harm to an individual or
to the public interest." MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 3.8 cmt. For similar reasons,
Standard 55.2(b) of the NDAA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 21, provides that the
disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant should not be required so long as the
"failure to disclose will not infringe on the constitutional rights of the defendant."
See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); United States v.
61.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
See, e.g., McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1554, 1567 n.14 (11th Cir. 1996),
62.
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2514 (1997) (noting that decisions about disclosure, which the court
described as "often difficult," should be left to prosecutors "who possess the requisite legal
acumen"); Walker v. New York, 974 F.2d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 1992).
A number of courts have explicitly held that a police officer is under no
63.
constitutional obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defendant. See, e.g.,
McMillian, 88 F.3d at 1567 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2514 (1997); Walker,
974 F.2d at 298-99 (2d Cir. 1992); Campbell v. Maine, 632 F. Supp. 111, 121 (D. Me.
1985), aff'd, 787 F.2d 776 (1st Cir. 1986); Hauptmann v. Wilentz, 570 F. Supp. 351, 389 &
n.43 (D.N.J. 1983), aff'd, 770 F.2d 1070 (3d Cir. 1985). In each of these cases, however,
the government was represented in the criminal prosecution by a licensed attorney. Thus,
courts holding that a police officer has no duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the
defense have simply assumed the presence of a prosecuting attorney. Some courts have
stated that a police officer has a constitutional obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence
to the prosecutor. See, e.g., McMillian, 88 F.3d at 1567; Walker, 974 F.2d at 298-99;
Campbell, 632 F. Supp. at 121. It is unclear what those statements would mean when the
police officer and the prosecutor are the same person.
See Daniel J. Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs
64.
Problems of ProsecutorialDiscretion and Retrospective Review, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 391,
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defendant does become aware of exculpatory evidence and can establish that it was
in the prosecutor's control, he or she still has quite an uphill battle in order to
overturn a conviction. A conviction will be overturned only if the undisclosed
evidence is "material" and if there is a "reasonable probability" that, had the
disclosure been made, the "result of the proceeding would have been different."65
Moreover, under current case law, due process appears to require only that
exculpatory information be provided sufficiently in advance of trial to allow for its
use at trial." Consequently, it may well be that a defendant who pleads guilty when
a prosecutor has withheld exculpatory evidence cannot seek to have his or her
conviction overturned on those grounds. 7
It is widely acknowledged that the existence of ethical rules that
encourage prosecuting attorneys to engage in broad and early discovery68 can play
an enormously productive role in the fair and efficient functioning of the criminal
justice system.69 However, more critical to the concerns that arise when a police
officer acts as a prosecutor are the ethical rules relating to the disclosure of
exculpatory evidence. Because the legal remedies available to a defendant who is
the victim of nondisclosure offer so little protection, the ethical obligations placed
upon an attorney to disclose exculpatory evidence 70 are of paramount importance.
In light of the fact that exculpatory evidence often will be in the sole possession of

391 (1984); Stephen P. Jones, Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Disclose
ExculpatoryEvidence, 25 U. MEM. L. REv. 735, 764 (1995).
65.
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
66.
See, e.g., LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 20.7(g); United States v.
Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1283 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 262
(3d Cir. 1984).
67.
The question of whether a prosecutor has any constitutional obligation to
disclose exculpatory evidence in a case in which the defendant pleads guilty has yet to be
resolved by the United States Supreme Court, and lower courts are split on the issue. See
generally Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1989); Note, The Prosecutor'sDuty to Disclose to Defendants Pleading
Guilty, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1004 (1986).
For example, Standard 52.2 of the NDAA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra
68.
note 21, encourages prosecutors to "diligently pursue discovery of material information and
freely, fully, and promptly comply with lawful discovery requests from defense counsel."
The commentary to that Standard suggests that prosecutors should "seek to exceed" the
minimum compliance requirements for discovery "in every case where it is appropriate." Id.
Standard 52.2 cmt.
69.
The A.B.A. Prosecution Standards note that "many experienced prosecutors
have habitually disclosed most, if not all, of their evidence to defense counsel. This practice,
it is believed, often leads to guilty pleas in cases that would otherwise be tried." A.B.A.
PROSECTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-3.11 cmt. "Voluntary disclosure also
serves to open areas in which the parties can stipulate to undisputed or other facts for which
a courtroom contest is a waste of time." Id.
MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 3.8(d); MODEL CODE, supra note 17, DR
70.
7-103(b); A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-3.11; NDAA
PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 21, Standards 25.4, 53.5.
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the prosecution, 7 a defendant is forced to rely to an extraordinary extent on the
good faith of an ethical prosecuting attorney to disclose that evidence.
The ethical obligations placed upon prosecuting attorneys to disclose
exculpatory evidence are far broader and offer a defendant far greater protection
than the minimum constitutional disclosure requirements. The American Bar
Association Standards for Criminal Justice require a prosecuting attorney to "make
timely disclosure to the defense, at the earliest feasible opportunity, of the
existence of all evidence or information which tends to negate the guilt of the
accused or mitigate the offense charged or which would tend to reduce the
punishment of the accused."72 Both the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility contain similar provisions: the
Model Rules require the "timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or
information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense,"'73 while the Model Code requires the "timely disclosure.. .of
the existence of evidence, known to the prosecutor.. .that tends to negate the guilt
74
of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment."
Thus, a prosecuting attorney is ethically obligated to disclose exculpatory
information to the defense early on, not just on the eve of a trial if there is one.
Equally importantly, a prosecuting attorney is ethically obligated to disclose all
exculpatory evidence or information, not just that evidence or information that the
prosecutor deems to be material and that the prosecutor concludes could have an
impact on the outcome of the proceedings. In addition, the Standards for Criminal
Justice make explicit another obligation that is implied by the other ethical
guidelines, providing that a prosecuting attorney "should not intentionally avoid
pursuit of evidence because he or she believes it will damage the prosecution's
case or aid the accused."75 All of these rules, if followed, provide for a far greater
flow of information to the defense. Thus, even if a police prosecutor were to abide
by the minimal disclosure requirements outlined by the Supreme Court's due
process decisions, significant categories of evidence that an attorney would
disclose in accordance with his or her ethical duties might never be disclosed by a
police prosecutor.76
See supra note 64.
71.
A.B.A. PRosEcuTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-3.11(a).
72.
MODELRuLEs, supra note 17, Rule 3.8(d).
73.
MODELCODE, supra note 17, DR 7-103(B).
74.
A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-3.11(c).
75.
One need look no further than the facts of one of the United States Supreme
76.
Court's leading cases in this area, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), for an
example of the difference. The defendant in that case was convicted after trial of murder in
the second degree despite her claim of self-defense. Id. at 98-99. The testimony at trial
revealed that the decedent was in possession of two knives shortly before the incident, but
the prosecutor failed to disclose to the defense that the decedent had been convicted of the
crimes of assault and possession of a deadly weapon. Id. at 99-101. Under the prevailing
local law, evidence of these convictions would have been admissible at trial to establish that
the decedent had a history of violence and may well have been the aggressor. Id. at 100 &
n.3. While a prosecuting attorney was ethically obligated to disclose that information, see
supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text, the Supreme Court held that the non-disclosed
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Even with the existence of clear and binding ethical rules, the pressure to
suppress exculpatory evidence often overwhelms a prosecuting attorney;' in the
absence of any ethical obligation to disclose, the pressure to suppress even
evidence that must be disclosed under the Constitution would seem to face even
less resistance. As reluctant as a prosecuting attorney may be to turn over
exculpatory material to the defense, it is not hard to imagine that the arresting
officer or department would be that much less likely to do so in the absence of
mandatory ethical rules. There are several reasons that a police officer who is not

an attorney might withhold exculpatory evidence. First, as noted earlier, the simple
failure to identify the evidence as exculpatory might prevent disclosure. Second,
the evidence might expose illegal or inappropriate conduct on the part of that
officer or one of his or her colleagues, creating a risk of litigation or internal
sanction. Third, the evidence might be inconsistent with something that was said to
the accused or others for the purpose of investigation or during an interrogation;
while it seems clear that lying to or misleading an accused for these purposes is
both common and entirely legal,78 an officer may not choose to have his or her
tactics exposed.79 Fourth, the officer may have some kind of personal agenda
concerning the particular case or defendant, or may simply hold the belief that the
accused is guilty of the crime or crimes charged.
Concerns about police suppression of exculpatory evidence are made all
the more realistic in light of the significant evidence of rampant police lying and
perjury. Virtually every investigation into the topic has reached the conclusion that
lying among police officers extends far beyond the investigative context, in which

evidence was not material, and that the prosecutor's failure to disclose it did not violate the
defendant's right to due process of law. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 113-14.
77.
See, e.g., C. Ronald Huff & Arye Rattner, Convicted But Innocent: False
Positives and the Criminal Justice Process, in CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES INCRIME AND
JUSTICE 130, 137 (Joseph E. Scott & Travis Hirschi eds., 1988)(noting that prosecutors'
failure to disclose exculpatory evidence due to the "pressure to obtain convictions" is
"[p]robably the single most important contribution to false conviction made by
prosecutors"); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutorsfor Brady
Violations: A PaperTiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 694 (1987) (noting that "[p]rosecutorial
suppression of exculpatory evidence or presentation of false evidence is not an isolated
phenomenon"); Jones, supra note 64, at 747 (noting that United States Supreme Court
decisions on the disclosure of exculpatory evidence suggest that a "constitutional remedy is
necessary because of the lack of effectiveness of the ethical rules").
78.

See, e.g., Jerome H. Skolnick, Deception by Police, CRIM. JUST. ETHmcs,

Summer/Fall 1982, at 40, 43 (suggesting that "[o]ne might properly conclude, from
examining police practices that have been subjected to the highest appellate review, that the
police are authoritatively encouraged to lie"). See also Deborah Young, UnnecessaryEvil:
Police Lying in Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. REv. 425 (1996); Laura Hoffman Roppe,
Comment, True Blue? Whether PoliceShould Be Allowed to Use Trickery and Deception to
Extract Confessions, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 729 (1994).
79.
Professor Deborah Young has suggested that police officers may be reluctant
to have these sorts of tactics exposed for fear that it might result in a loss of public trust and
respect for the police. Young, supra note 78, at 458-59.
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it has held to be legally justifiable, and into the realm of outright perjury.8 ° The
common consensus in the literature is that "perjury represents a subcultural norm
rather than an individual aberration" for police officers."1 The most common
explanations and justifications for police perjury include: protecting the arresting
officer, other police officers, or some notion of police authority in general;
avoiding the suppression of evidence obtained through illegal police conduct; and
assuring the criminal prosecution and conviction of an individual that the officer
has determined to be guilty of that particular crime or of other crimes that might
not be prosecuted. 2
The only real motivation for a prosecuting attorney to disclose
exculpatory evidence, and the only real check on the suppression of exculpatory
evidence, is that attorneys are bound by ethical rules and, at least in theory, subject
to discipline. 3 Without a code or rule that binds a police officer to disclose
exculpatory evidence, it is unclear what would motivate a police officer who has
decided to prosecute a case to disclose exculpatory evidence, particularly if he or
she is convinced that the accused is guilty.
D. Plea Negotiations
The vast majority of criminal cases, particularly misdemeanors, are
resolved by some form of negotiated plea.' Like many other parts of the criminal
justice process, plea negotiations are largely unreviewed and unreviewable. And
like every other part of the process, a presumption of legal expertise provides some
assurance that the system is functioning roughly as designed. The lack of legal
expertise is a significant concern during those plea negotiations conducted by
police prosecutors. A negotiation can go awry for a large variety of reasons,
including poor tactical choices, varying perceptions of the strength of one's
See, e.g., Tom Barker & David Carter, "Fluffing Up the Evidence and
80.
Covering Your Ass:" Some Conceptual Notes on Police Lying, 11 DEvIANr BEHAVIOR 61,
67-70 (1990); Fisher, supra note 35, at 9-17; Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury,
and the HeaterFactor:An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO.
L. REV.75, 82-83, 107 (1992); Sherman, supra note 35, at 15; Skolnick, supra note 78, at

42-43.
81.
82.
83.

Skolnick, supra note 78, at 42.
See sources cited supra note 80.
See, e.g., Disciplining Prosecutors,40 CRLm. L. REP. 2431 (1987) (noting

that "bar discipline may be the best available sanction against prosecutorial misconduct"
because appellate reversal of criminal convictions and contempt findings are rare and
because prosecutors "are virtually immune from civil liability for their professional
misdeeds"). On the other hand, several commentators have suggested that even the
disciplinary process provides little or no incentive for a prosecutor to comply with the
ethical disclosure requirements. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 77; Jones, supra note 64, at
747; Lyn M. Morton, Note, Seeking the Elusive Remedy for ProsecutorialMisconduct:
Suppression, Dismissal,or Discipline?,7 GEo. J. LEGALETHIcs 1083 (1994).
One statistical study of state criminal cases in 1995 concluded that only four
84.
percent of those cases were resolved with a trial. BRIAN J. OSTROM & NEAL B. KAUDER,
EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 1995: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT
STATISTICS PROJEC 57 (1996).
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position, and varying perceptions of power and leverage. A police officer who has
misapprehended the strength or weakness of his or her case, or who is simply a
poorly skilled negotiator, will alter the outcome of a plea negotiation in a
significant way. In some situations, the accused may wind up with "too good a
deal" from the public's point of view; in others, the accused may be treated too
harshly.
When a defendant is unrepresented by counsel, as he or she often will be
in misdemeanor cases, 5 a particularly troubling scenario inevitably ensues. A
defendant will often have any number of questions about how the system functions,
what the consequences of a plea offer are likely to be, whether a given explanation
of his or her conduct constitutes a legal defense, what the possible sentence after
trial may be, and so forth. In practical terms, an unrepresented defendant may well
look to the prosecutor for information and advice, making a set of assumptions
about the prosecutor's duty to be relatively objective and fair or, at a minimum,
truthful. As Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens has explained, for a criminal
defendant "the assistance of someone to explain why he is being held, the nature of
the charges against him, and the extent of his legal rights, may be of such
importance as to overcome what is obvious to most, that the prosecutor is a foe and
not a friend." 6 Even in those situations in which a police prosecutor tries in good
faith to provide objective information or advice, that information or advice is
reasonably likely to be inaccurate, misleading, or biased. 7 In the context of a
negotiated plea, a judge will rarely engage in more than a superficial colloquy to
assure that the defendant has some minimal understanding of the plea and its
immediate consequences; that sort of inquiry is highly unlikely to expose a
defendant's reliance on suspect information or advice. 8 Neither the accused nor
85.
In a national survey published in 1981, forty-one percent of misdemeanor
court judges indicated that defendants who plead guilty were "infrequently" or "never"
represented at the time of the plea. MISDEMEANOR COURTS, supra note 6, at B-14. In that
same survey, eleven percent of the judges indicated that defendants were "infrequently" or
"never" represented by an attorney at trial. Id. at B-15.
86.
Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 310 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87.
Id. (noting that "the adversary posture of the parties.. .will inevitably tend to
color the advice offered").
88.
In an extremely enlightening and disturbing essay, Francis D. Doucette, a
Massachusetts criminal defense attorney, has shed light on this process by describing and
discussing one particular case that was handled by a police prosecutor in a Massachusetts
district court. Francis D. Doucette, Non-Appointment of Counsel in Indigent Criminal
Cases:A Case Study, 31 NEw ENG. L. REv. 495 (1997). Two defendants, one the driver of a
vehicle and the other a passenger, were charged with the misdemeanor offense of possession
of marijuana with the intent to distribute. Id. at 496. After what the author describes as a
"brief conference in the corridor" between the police prosecutor and the two unrepresented
defendants, the case was summarily resolved with a negotiated plea. Id. at 496-97. The
judge accepted the plea agreement after "conducting a perfunctory colloquy regarding the
defendants' waiver of the right to ajury trial, and warning the defendants about immigration
consequences if they were not United States citizens." Id. at 497. As the author so cogently
points out, the defendants were certainly never advised of the variety of legal defenses that
might have been available to them, many of which seemed to have had a significant
likelihood of success. Id. at 497-99. One can only speculate on the contents of the "brief
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the public is well served by a process in which the only supposed legal expertise
comes from a police officer who is not licensed to practice law.
An attorney is ethically prohibited from giving advice to unrepresented
9
parties, most particularly to unrepresented adversaries. While it is possible for a
plea negotiation between a prosecutor and an unrepresented defendant to take place
without some form of discussion that could fairly be characterized as "advice," it is
quite difficult to accomplish. Any effort on the part of the prosecutor to discuss the
evidence in the case, the likelihood of conviction or the possible consequences of a
conviction after trial, or any effort on the part of the prosecutor to suggest that a
plea offer should be considered or accepted, must fairly be characterized as the
prohibited giving of advice.' Consequently, a prosecuting attorney's negotiation
with an unrepresented defendant, if it is to be conducted within ethical constraints,
requires a rigid adherence to a set of rules that would seem unnatural and perhaps
counter-intuitive to a police officer.
The ABA Criminal Justice Standards ("Standards") recognize the ethical
hazards that a prosecuting attorney faces in entering into a plea negotiation with an
unrepresented defendant, particularly given the inherently "unequal bargaining
positions between prosecutor and accused." 9' The commentary to Standard 3-4.1
counsels a prosecutor to
take great care not to state or imply to the accused that the
prosecutor is disinterested or on the accused person's "side." When
the prosecutor knows or reasonably should know that the
unrepresented person misunderstands the prosecutor's role in the
to correct such
matter, the prosecutor
92 must make reasonable efforts
a misunderstanding.

conference in the corridor," id. at 496, but the probability that it contained inaccurate,
misleading, or biased information is extremely high. Moreover, it is clear that the judge's
"perfunctory colloquy," id. at 497, would never have revealed any such impropriety.
Indeed, the author suggests that the pleas entered in the case may have been "involuntary"
because the defendants "were never advised by counsel at all but rather conferred for a few
minutes with a police prosecutor." Id. at 507.
See MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 4.3 cmt. (providing that an attorney
89.
"should not give advice to an unrepresented person other than the advice to obtain
counsel"); MODEL CODE, supra note 16, DR 7-104(A)(2) (providing that an attorney shall
not "[g]ive advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer, other than the advice to
secure counsel, if the interests of such person are or have a reasonable possibility of being
in conflict with the interests of his client"). For an excellent discussion of these rules and
their application to negotiations in civil litigation, see Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out
of Line: The Need for Regulation of Lawyers' Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor
Persons,85 CAL. L. REV. 79 (1997).
See Engler, supra note 89, at 93-101.
90.
A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-4.1 cmt.
91.
Id. See also MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 4.3 (containing virtually
92.
identical provisions).
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The Standards actually go so far as to recommend that a record of a plea
negotiation with an unrepresented defendant should be made and preserved. 3
These ethical standards acknowledge the practical reality that an
unrepresented defendant will often look to the prosecutor for advice. While an
attorney is ethically bound to clarify his or her role as prosecutor and to avoid
offering any sort of advice, the standards do not apply to police officers and,
therefore, do not prohibit a police officer's provision of advice to an unrepresented
defendant. In fact, it is clear that many forms of advice, such as an explanation of
the supposed advantages of cooperation, are a routine and legally acceptable part
94
of the police interrogation process.
Perhaps the largest ethical concern stemming from a police officer's
acting as a prosecutor in a negotiation is that there appear to be no boundaries
concerning what representations he or she may make to the accused. As a general
matter, attorneys are duty bound not to lie or misrepresent facts or law. 95
Prosecuting attorneys also face more specific obligations in the context of plea
negotiations, including the obligation not to imply more power to influence the
disposition than the prosecutor actually possesses96 and the obligation not to make
any assurances about what sentence will be imposed by the court. 7 The fine line
between misrepresentation and "puffery" is often quite difficult even for an
attorney to identify. 98 With a police officer as negotiator, it is not clear that there is
any incentive to find that line, as there appears to be no prohibition on
misrepresentation or lying by police officers. In the context of an investigation or
interrogation, deception and misrepresentation are common police tactics, and
courts have often held that such conduct on the part of an officer is entirely
93.
A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-4.1(b).
94.
See sources cited supra note 78.
95.
See MODEL RULEs, supra note 17, Rule 4.1(a) (providing that an attorney
shall not knowingly "make a false statement of material fact or law"); Rule 8.4(c)
(providing that an attorney shall not "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit
or misrepresentation"); MODEL CODE, supra note 17, DR 7-102(A)(5) (providing that an
attorney shall not "[k]nowingly make a false statement of law or fact"); DR 1-102(A)(4)
(providing that an attorney shall not "[e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation").
96.
A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-4.2(b); NDAA
PROSECUTTON STANDARDS, supra note 21, Standard 69.2.
97.
A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-4.2(a); NDAA
PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 21, Standard 69.1.
98.
In an excellent article on plea negotiation tactics, Professor Rodney J.
Uphoff asserts that "[t]he line between a lie or deliberate misrepresentation and bluffing,
posturing, puffing or gamesmanship.. .is not always clear." Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal
Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systematic Approach, 2 CUNICAL L. REv. 73,
123-24 (1995). Uphoff notes that "there is widespread disagreement among practitioners
and scholars as to the kinds of statements and tactics that are improper." Id. at 124. See also
MODELRULES, supra note 17, Rule 4.1 cmt. (acknowledging the ambiguities of negotiations
by noting that "[u]nder generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of
statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact"); James J. White,
Machiavelliand the Bar: EthicalLimitations on Lying in Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 926.
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lawful. 9 It is unclear when and under what provision or rule a police prosecutor
must change hats and expose a prior falsehood.
The negotiation process is laden with the same potential conflicts as is
every stage in the system that precedes it. An officer could use the negotiation
process for self-protection, either by brokering an agreement that ensures that he or
she will not be sued or by insisting on a harsh disposition. An officer could use a
plea negotiation to foster his or her own agenda, such as vying for an internal
promotion based on a good conviction rate. An officer who is a witness in the case
may have some personal interest in the case, may or may not want to appear as a
witness (overtime pay can be a great police motivator), and may want an unduly
harsh or unduly lenient result. Again, simple feelings about a particular case or a
particular defendant could be inappropriately injected into the process. While a
prosecuting attorney may be subject to the same kinds of motivations, he or she is
ethically prohibited from considering them in the plea negotiation process."
E. Witness Preparation
Several difficult issues arise when a trial attorney begins the process of
preparing a witness to testify in court. One such set of issues revolves around
professional competence. A successful direct examination at trial and the witness's
survival of cross-examination without heavy damage rely heavily upon pre-trial
preparation with the witness. For that reason, every leading trial advocacy text
involves some significant discussion of witness preparation.01 In order to properly
prepare a witness, a lawyer must have a thorough understanding of the applicable
rules of evidence; without that understanding, it would be quite difficult to prepare
an examination of a witness that would not elicit inadmissible or inappropriate
responses."x° In addition, the lawyer must have a sound theory of the case and must
have plotted out the way in which he or she intends to prove each element of the
offenses charged."° Someone with no legal training is extremely unlikely to be in
99.
See supra note 78.
100.
See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text. The NDAA National
Prosecution Standards highlight that plea negotiations "should not be used merely to
enhance the prosecutor's conviction record or clean up backlogs in his office" because "as a
prosecutor the responsibility is for a fair conviction, not a high conviction rate or easy
caseload." NDAA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 21, Standards 66-72 cmt.
See, e.g., ROGER HAYDOCK & JOHN SONsTENG, TRIAL: THEORms, TACTiCs,
101.
TECHNIQUES § 8.4 (1991); STEvEN LuBET, MODERN TRIAL ADvOCACY: ANALYSIs AND
PRACTICE 29-30, 79-81 (2d ed. 1997); THOAS A. MAUEr, TRiAL TECHNIQUES § 10.11(2)
(4th ed. 1996); ALBERT J. MOORE ET AL., TRIAL ADVOCACY: INFERENCES, ARGUMENTS AND
TECmQUEs, 157-59 (1996).
102.
See, e.g., HAYDOCK & SONSTENG, supra note 101, § 8.4(C) (stressing that an
advocate must give the witness a variety of specific instructions, including "to testify only
to what the witness saw, did, said, or heard" and to "avoid[] speculation, guesses, and
assumptions"); MAUET, supra note 101, § 10.11(2) (stressing that an advocate must
"[p]repare the witness for the procedural and evidentiary rules that govern his testimony").
103.
See, e.g., HAYDOCK & SONSTENG, supra note 101, § 8.3(A) (stressing that
"[tihe preparation of direct examination begins with a review of the legal theories, actual
story, and significant issues of the case"); MAUET, supra note 101, § 10.11(2) (stressing
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control of these various facets of trial preparation. The public is certainly poorly
served when a criminal prosecution is entrusted to a person with no legal training
on how to prepare a witness.
As every practicing attorney recognizes, the line between preparing a
witness to testify effectively and suborning perjury is often quite thin and quite
evasive. 1" Like in so many other parts of the criminal justice system, the process
relies almost purely on a prosecutor's sense of ethics as a means of protecting the
legal system and the accused. The temptation to simply tell the witness what it is
that you would like him or her to say is likely to be overwhelming, even for the
officer who is operating in good faith."° s Similarly, there is a substantial temptation
to encourage a witness to inject inadmissible evidence into a trial, particularly for a
police prosecutor who is frustrated by evidentiary or procedural rules that may
seem unduly restrictive. Expecting an untrained police officer to comply with these
rules is unrealistic, particularly because there appears to be no compelling reason
for an officer to do so.
F. Trial
The issues arising from the lack of prosecutorial expertise during a trial,
while not the most alarming or disturbing of such issues, are probably the most
readily apparent. From the point of view of the accused, they are not the most
alarming because they take place in public and are, therefore, the most subject to
judicial review and correction. From the point of view of protecting the public,
however, they are of paramount importance. Law schools across the country have
recognized that trial advocacy encompasses a complex combination of skills
requiring rigorous academic study and practice. 6 In order to be an effective
advocate at trial, one must have a solid understanding of the rules of evidence and

that, in order to properly prepare a witness to testify, an advocate should know "what [he or
she is] legally required to prove, what [his or her] theory of the case is, and what [his or her]
themes and labels will be for the trial").
104.
See LUBET, supra note 101, at 79-81; Monroe H. Freedman, Professional
Responsibility of the CriminalDefense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L.
REv. 1469, 1478-82 (1966); Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission":
Reflections on the "Right" to Presenta FalseCase, GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 125, 131 & n.31
(1987); Richard C. Wydick, The Ethics of Witness Coaching, 17 CARDozo L. REV. 1
(1995). Professors Freedman, Subin, and Wydick each refer in their discussions to a famous
scene from ROBERT TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER (1958), in which a defense attorney
describes the elements of an insanity defense to a client prior to seeking the client's version
of the events surrounding a murder. That scene has been the source for a great many law
school discussions of the ethical issues involved in witness preparation.
Professor Deborah Young has suggested that the same concepts that motivate
105.
police officers to lie in the investigative stage of a case may well lead those same officers to
encourage witnesses to lie. Young, supranote 78, at 463.
106.
This author's survey of recent law school catalogues revealed that
approximately ninety-five percent of American law schools offer a course that incorporates
trial advocacy skills.
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of the issues of proof at the trial." In addition, one must have a well developed
theory of the case, sometimes involving complex judgments about what evidence to
introduce and when and how to introduce it.' One must also have the ability to
convey the trial theory effectively to the trier of fact. In a criminal case, legal issues
involving the suppression of evidence are frequently litigated pre-trial, requiring
expertise on a variety of constitutional and statutory issues. A police officer with
no law school training is not in a good position to possess or acquire this
knowledge and these skills. The failure to introduce admissible evidence, the
inadvertent failure to prove an element of an offense, and simple lack of advocacy
skills are quite likely to interfere with the successful prosecution of a criminal case.
Obviously, the public at large is not well served by a botched prosecution.
The lack of prosecutorial skill will inevitably lead to some troubling
situations. A judge might well be tempted to respond to a police prosecutor's lack
of skill by offering some advice or assistance, either in bench conferences laden
with explicit or subtle advice or by questioning witnesses from the bench. A judge
may feel bound to explain the foundational requirements for a piece of evidence or
to point out an obvious failure of proof on the part of the untrained prosecutor
rather than simply dismiss a case due to prosecutorial ineptitude."°9 Under such
circumstances, the public perception of a neutral judiciary is severely damaged, as
the judge becomes, in essence, a second prosecutor.1 Indeed, a number of courts
have held that undue judicial participation in a prosecution violates the defendant's
right to due process of law."'
Lack of knowledge and skill will also inevitably lead to prosecutorial
misconduct during the course of a trial. As reflected by the various ethical rules
107.
Every leading trial advocacy text devotes an entire chapter to a discussion of
making and responding to evidentiary objections at trial. See, e.g., HAYDOCK & SONSTENG,
supra note 101, § 5; LUBEr, supra note 101, at 261-309; MAUET, supra note 101, § 9;
MooREEr AL., supra note 101, at 292-310.
Similarly, every leading trial advocacy text contains an extensive discussion
108.
of the importance of developing a sound theory of the case. See, e.g., HAYDOCK &
SONSTENG, supra note 101, § 3.3; LUBET, supra note 101, at 8-10; MAUEr, supra note 101,
§ 10.6; MOORE ET AL., supra note 101, at 9-64.
109.
This is precisely what occurred in State v. Morin, 327 A.2d 702 (N.H. 1974).
In a trial concerning a drunk driving charge, a police prosecutor's attempt to prove that the
defendant was driving relied exclusively on the use of hearsay evidence. Id. at 702. When
that attempt failed, the police prosecutor rested his case. Id. Instead of granting the
defendant's motion to dismiss the case due to the obvious failure of proof, the judge on his
own motion continued the case in order for the police prosecutor to call a witness to supply
additional evidence. Id. The resulting conviction was of no small consequence to the
defendant, who was sentenced to thirty days in jail and a three year license revocation. Id. at
702-03. For a more detailed discussion of this case, see infra notes 165-71 and
accompanying text.
See Morin, 327 A.2d at 703-04 (Griffith, J., dissenting) (finding that "an
110.
ordinary person in the position of [the] defendant would feel that the combined prosecution
by the prosecutor and the court was unjust").
111.
See, e.g., Figueroa Ruiz v. Delgado, 359 F.2d 718 (lst Cir. 1966); United
States v. Marzano, 149 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1945); Furtado v. Furtado, 402 N.E.2d 1024
(Mass. 1980).
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that guide attorneys, trial attorneys are required to exercise legal judgment before
posing questions and making arguments. Rule 3.4(e) of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct provides that, throughout the course of a trial, an attorney
shall not "allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably
believe.. .will... be supported by admissible evidence.... 2 A prosecuting attorney
may refer in an opening statement only to evidence that the prosecutor has "a good
faith and reasonable basis for believing.. .will be tendered and admitted in
evidence."' 3 During the presentation of evidence, a prosecuting attorney may not
knowingly "offer inadmissible evidence, ask legally objectionable questions, or
make other impermissible comments or arguments."". 4 A prosecuting attorney may
not display tangible evidence in front of a judge or jury unless he or she has "a
reasonable basis for its admission in evidence."" 5 The commentary to the ABA
Criminal Justice Standards suggests that a "high level of experienced litigation
judgment is often required, and a prosecution office should have its senior
litigation lawyers available for consultation," when decisions regarding the
admissibility of evidence are at issue." 6 These particular ethical provisions are
structured not only to provide ethical guidance for the trial attorney, but also to
assist the trial attorney in avoiding reversible or prejudicial error. A police officer
is obviously in no position to make this complex series of legal judgments, and
errors will inevitably result. In the face of a legally inappropriate argument or
question, a judge may be forced to resort to the costly remedy of declaring a
mistrial.
As in other areas of a criminal prosecution, there are significant ethical
restraints that a prosecuting attorney must respect during the trial of a criminal
case. Most fundamentally, an attorney is ethically prohibited from introducing
evidence that he or she knows to be false. 11 7 Throughout a trial, a prosecuting
attorney is required to act fairly and in good faith."' A prosecuting attorney may
not ask a question that implies a fact that the prosecutor has no good faith basis to
believe is true." 9 A prosecuting attorney may not "use the power of crossexamination to discredit or undermine a witness if the prosecutor knows the
witness is testifying truthfully,"' 2 nor should a prosecuting attorney seek to

112.
MODEL RULES, supranote 17, Rule 3.4(e). See also MODEL CODE, supra note
17, DR 7-106(C).
113.
A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-5.5; NDAA
PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 21, Standard 76.2.
114.
A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-5.6(b).
115.
Id. at Standard 3-5.6(d).
116.
Id. at Standard 3-5.6 cmt.
117.
MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 3.3(a)(4); MODEL CODE, supra note 17,
DR 7-102(A)(4); A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-5.6(a).
118.
See A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standards 3-5.5 to 35.9; NDAA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 21, Standards 76,77, 85.
119.
A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-5.7(d); NDAA
PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 21, Standard 77.2.
120.
A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-5.7(b); NDAA
PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 21, Standard 77.5 & cmt.
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"intimidate or humiliate [a] witness unnecessarily."' 2' No such ethical constraints
bind a police prosecutor, leaving a defendant with no recourse for abuse of the trial
process unless that abuse becomes apparent to the presiding judge.
If the police prosecutor is also a witness in the case, as must happen
routinely when the police prosecutor is also the arresting officer in the case,122 a
separate set of ethical concerns comes into play. Under both the Model Rules and
the Model Code, an attorney is generally precluded from participating as an
advocate in a trial in which he or she is likely to be a witness."n In particular, most
courts have "disapproved of the practice of a prosecuting attorney's testifying in a
case," allowing the practice only "under extraordinary circumstances."' 4 These
restrictions are founded on two distinct, but interrelated, concerns. First, there is a
significant risk that the fact-finder will blur the distinction between the person's
two roles. As described in the commentary to the Model Rules, "[a] witness is
required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is
expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be clear
whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an
analysis of the proof."'" As a consequence, the defendant may be deprived of a fair
opportunity to cross-examine a statement made by the police officer in his or her
capacity as an advocate, but absorbed by the fact-finder as testimony. Second, the
restrictions help guard against the likelihood that the fact-finder will accord a
witness's testimony greater weight if that witness is also an officer of the court or,
in the case of a prosecutor, a representative of the government. While a fact-finder
might be inappropriately deferential to police testimony under the best of
exaggerated when that police officer is
circumstances, the problem is significantly
12 6
given the power to prosecute the case.
G. Sentencing
While the sentencing decision in a criminal case rests with the judge, it is
clear that the prosecutorial recommendation with respect to sentencing, even in a
case in which there has been no plea agreement; carries a great deal of weight. In
order to make an appropriate sentencing decision, an attorney must be well versed
121.
A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-5.7(a); NDAA
PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 21, Standards 77.1, 77.6 & cmt.
See MISDEMEANOR COURTS, supra note 6, at B-16.
122.
MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 3.7(a); MODEL CODE, supra note 17, DR
123.
5-102(A).
124.
Erwin S. Barbre, Annotation, ProsecutingAttorney as a Witness in Criminal
Case, 54 A.L.R.3d 100, § 2(a) (1974).
125.
MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 3.7 cmt.
126.
In People v. Paperno,429 N.E.2d 797 (1981), a criminal case in which the
prosecutor who tried the case had significant involvement at the investigatory stage, the
New York Court of Appeals acknowledged the seriousness of these issues. In addressing
concern about statements made by an advocate with personal knowledge about the case, the
court noted that the "unsworn witness rule" is "founded upon the possible danger that the
jury, impressed by the prestige of the office of the District Attorney, will accord great
weight to the beliefs and opinions of the prosecutor." Id. at 801.
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not only in local practice, but also in the legal aspects of any sentencing guidelines
or requirements. A police officer with no legal training, and particularly an
arresting officer who prosecutes only those cases in which he or she has made an
arrest, is unlikely to be able to represent the public effectively at a sentencing
proceeding.
Ethical obligations bind a prosecuting attorney at the sentencing stage of a
criminal prosecution. Most importantly, a prosecutor "should not make the severity
of sentences the index of his or her effectiveness.... [H]e or she should seek to
assure that a fair and informed judgment is made on the sentence and to avoid
unfair sentence disparities."' 27 In addition, a prosecuting attorney is ethically
required, in connection with sentencing, to "disclose to the defense and to the
tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor.'. 8 A
police prosecutor faces no such ethical restrictions, and appears free to request
whatever sentence he or she deems appropriate for that particular defendant,
whether harsh or lenient, based on whatever motivations and biases that police
prosecutor may have. Additionally, there appears to be no particular incentive for a
police prosecutor to provide mitigating sentencing information to a court unless he
or she is interested in having a lenient sentence imposed.
H. A Closing Comment About Legal Competence and On-The-Job Training
It may be tempting for one to conclude that, in the context of a
misdemeanor prosecution, on-the-job training will be a sufficient substitute for
legal education with respect to the development of legal competence. This
conclusion is sorely misguided for two clearly identifiable reasons. First and
foremost, it relies on the premise that trial-and-error is an effective learning
technique. In the absence of any qualified supervision, there is simply no assurance
that persistent errors will ever be detected. Worse yet, if those errors do not reap
visibly bad results, it is highly likely that erroneous practices will be "learned" and
repeated. In the misdemeanor setting, most defendants plead guilty at a very early
stage of the prosecution, making it unlikely that erroneous charging decisions will
ever surface. For similar reasons, it is equally unlikely that anyone would be in a
position to bring erroneous discovery decisions to the attention of a police
prosecutor. While poor witness preparation or poor trial advocacy skills are more
likely to come to the attention of a particular police prosecutor, it is unlikely that he
or she will have an adequate opportunity to correct those problems. In most of the
jurisdictions that allow police prosecution, it appears that the police prosecutor is
generally the arresting officer. 29 Because the percentage of misdemeanor cases that
result in a trial is extremely low, 3 ° it is hard to imagine that any individual officer
would accumulate enough experience to have a noticeable impact on his or her
127.

A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-6.1(a); NDAA
21, Standard 88.4.
MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 3.8(d); MODEL CODE, supra note 17, DR
See also A.B.A. PROsECtrrION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-6.2(b).
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
See supra note 84.

PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note

128.
7-10303).
129.
130.
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skills. In those jurisdictions in which an individual police officer is designated as a
police prosecutor, there is a slightly greater chance of learning through experience,
but the very significant drawbacks of trial-and-error learning remaih unabated.
The conclusion that on-the-job training might be sufficient in the
misdemeanor context also relies on the premise that misdemeanor cases are
unlikely to present complex legal issues. In fact, it is well recognized that many
misdemeanor cases present extremely complicated legal and factual issues.' 3 '
Perhaps the clearest example is in the area of drunk driving, which is widely
32
acknowledged to be "one of the most challenging legal fields of study today."'
Donald H. Nichols, one of the nation's leading authors on drunk driving litigation,
has noted that, in order to effectively prosecute a drunk driving case, a prosecutor
"must grapple with scientific issues, constitutional issues, statutory issues,
procedural issues and numerous areas of civil and criminal law."' 33 Domestic
violence cases also often raise complicated evidentiary questions, such as the
admissibility of the alleged perpetrator's prior bad acts and, when a complaining
witness refuses to testify, the admissibility of his or her prior statements to the
police. The prosecution of any category of possessory crimes will inevitably
involve complicated search and seizure issues. And as the United States Supreme
Court has recognized, disorderly conduct cases, vagrancy cases, public
drunkenness cases and the like frequently "bristle with thorny constitutional
questions.' ' 134 Thus, the premise that misdemeanor prosecution is "easy" and can be
left in the hands of the legally untrained is quite far off the mark.
Even if one were to accept the concept that on-the-job training would lead
to sufficient legal competence, all of the concerns raised by the lack of ethical rules
described in the preceding section of this Article would remain unaddressed.
Furthermore, as will be examined in detail in Parts IV and V of this Article, there
are a variety of legal and public policy concerns that would likewise remain
unaddressed. Before proceeding to those issues, however, this Article will review
the scant legal authority for the practice of police prosecution.

III. EXISTING LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR POLICE PROSECUTION
As noted earlier, one is hard pressed to find any explicit legal authority or
justification for the practice of allowing police officers to prosecute criminal cases.
In only two states-South Carolina and New Hampshire-have the highest courts
See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33 (1972) (noting that the
131.
Court was "by no means convinced that legal and constitutional questions involved" in
petty-offense cases "are any less complex" than those involved in other criminal cases);
Doucette, supra note 88, at 500 (1997) (noting that "labeling a criminal offense a
misdemeanor gives little or no clue to its legal or factual complexity").
132.
See, e.g., 1 DoNALD H. NIcHoLs, DRINKoNG/DRavING LrTGATION: CRIMINAL
AND CiviL vii (1996).
133.
Id.
134.
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33 (1972). Statutes aimed at these types
of offenses can often be challenged as unconstitutionally vague or, in the case of disorderly
conduct, as violative of the defendant's free speech rights under the First Amendment.
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specifically ruled on and authorized the practice. In the federal system and in two
other states-New York and Delaware-some support for the practice can be
found in the decisions of several lower courts, while in three other statesMassachusetts, Maine, and Iowa-police prosecution is at least arguably
authorized by statute. This section of the Article will examine and analyze those
cases and statutes.
A. Common Law Authority for Police Prosecution
In a series of court opinions spanning the last twenty-five years, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina has specifically authorized the prosecution of
misdemeanor criminal cases by police officers in its lower trial courts. In 1972, the
court invoked its powers under the common law to specifically approve for the first
time the practice of allowing the arresting police officer to prosecute a criminal
case, noting that-such a practice had prevailed in the state's magistrate's courts for
at least a decade.'35 In that case, State v. Messervy, an intermediate appellate court
had overturned a criminal conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol
because the arresting officer had made a closing argument to the jury in the case
after also testifying as a witness. 136 The Supreme Court of South Carolina
reinstated the conviction, relying predominantly on two notions that it failed to
develop or explain sufficiently. First, it indicated without further explanation that
"the large number of traffic court violations" prosecuted in the magistrate's courts
rendered the appearance of a prosecuting attorney impracticable.' 37 Because the
court failed to differentiate between criminal cases and non-criminal cases, this
economic justification for the practice of police prosecution is virtually impossible
to evaluate.' It is highly unlikely, however, that criminal offenses constitute a
significant percentage of the court's "traffic" violations. Second, the court
indicated that "[tihe patrolman's conduct (same as an attorney) is subject to the
scrutiny of the magistrate at all times.... ,,9In fact, very few of a prosecutor's most
important discretionary decisions actually take place in the presence of a judge,
and even those that do cannot readily be subjected to effective judicial review.
One of the ironies of the court's holding is that it authorized misdemeanor
prosecution only by the arresting officer,"' the officer who is most likely to have a
personal stake in the case and to be influenced by that personal stake. Moreover,
prosecution by individual arresting officers rather than designated police
prosecutors virtually assures that the police prosecutor will have no expertise in the
art of prosecution and that different defendants will be treated differently based on
the personality of the arresting officer.

135.
State v. Messervy, 187 S.E.2d 524 (S.C. 1972).
136.
Id. at 524.
137.
Id. at 525.
138.
For a full discussion and critique of the economic justification for allowing
police prosecution, see infranotes 415-28 and accompanying text.
139.
Messervy, 187 S.E.2d. at 525 (parenthetical in original).
140.
Id.
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Several years after deciding Messervy, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina both clarified and expanded its prior ruling on the practice of police
prosecution. In State ex rel. McLeod v. Seaborn,'4' the court expanded the pool of
those police officers who may prosecute a criminal case from only the arresting
officer to include the arresting officer's supervisors. More importantly, the court
addressed an issue that had not been raised in its prior decision: whether such a
practice constitutes the unauthorized practice of law by a person without a
license.'42 A South Carolina statute provides that "[n]o person may practice or
solicit the cause of another person in a court of this State unless he has been
'
admitted and sworn as an attorney."143
Despite the clear and unambiguous language
of that statute, and over the objection of the state's Attorney General,'" the court
held that "the prosecution of misdemeanor traffic violations in the magistrates'
courts by either the arresting officer or a supervisory officer assisting the arresting
officer does not constitute the unlawful practice of law."' 45 In reaching this
extraordinary conclusion, the court noted that prosecuting police officers prosecute
"intheir official capacities as law enforcement officers and employees of the
State."'" The court then concluded that prosecuting police officers "do not hold
themselves out to the public as attorneys, and their activity in the magistrates'
courts does not jeopardize the public by placing 'incompetent and unlearned
individuals in the practice of law.""' 47 The court justified its holding by asserting
that police prosecution "renders an important service to the public by promoting
the prompt and efficient administration of justice,"'" and that it could "discern no
purpose or policy consistent with [the statute prohibiting unauthorized practice]
that would be served by enjoining the Highway Patrol from continuing this
activity."' 49
The primary assertion underlying the court's opinion, that police officers
are not "'incompetent and unlearned individuals in the practice of law,"".' 50 is, of
course, open to serious debate. It is hard to imagine that the court honestly believed
that the minimal training received at the police academy is an acceptable substitute
for attendance at and graduation from an accredited law school and the passage of
a bar examination; if that were the court's position, it is unclear why a police
officer should not then be allowed to represent a criminal defendant in a pending

141.
244 S.E.2d 317 (S.C. 1978).
142.
Id. at 318.
143.
S.C. COD ANN. § 40-5-310 (Law. Co-op. 1997).
144.
McLeod, 244 S.E.2d at 318.
145.
Id. at 319.
146.
Id. Any implication that employment by the State was central to the court's
decision is belied by the court's subsequent decision in Easley v. Cartee, 424 S.E.2d 491
(S.C. 1992), in which the court held that privately employed licensed security officers may
prosecute misdemeanor cases.
147.
McLeod, 244 S.E.2d at 319 (quoting State v. Wells, 5 S.E.2d 181, 186 (S.C.
1939)).
148.
Id. at 319.
149.
Id.
150.
Id. (quoting Wells, 5 S.E.2d at 186).

1334

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1305

case. Moreover, the court's reasoning completely ignores the very important role
that the obedience to ethical rules plays in the professional life of any prosecutor.
A well-reasoned dissent, authored by Chief Justice Lewis, raised several
of these issues.' First, the dissent pointed out that a prosecuting police officer
performs many activities, including making and resisting motions, examining and
cross-examining witnesses, making and resisting objections to the admission of
evidence, arguing points of law to the court, and presenting arguments to the jury,
that clearly constitute the practice of law.' After concluding that the majority's
holding was in conflict with the statute, the dissent provided a catalogue of some of
the very troubling issues that the holding raised but did not resolve:
What degree of competency is required of these newly created
attorneys? By what Code of Ethics will their professional conduct
be judged? What authority will discipline them? Will this Court
have the authority to suspend or disbar them from further practice in
the magistrates' courts, if they are found guilty of misconduct; or
will the State Highway Patrol have the sole right to judge the
conduct of its employees and, therefore, the ethical standards of this
new breed of lawyer that the majority opinion is153now permitting to
be created by edict of the Highway Department?
The Chief Justice opined that the court should consider authorizing the practice of
law by what he termed a "paralegal" only after "standards for their competence,
conduct, and regulation are established, for, if the State can be represented by a
paid paralegal, certainly the defendant can also."' 54 The Chief Justice concluded
' 55
that "[e]xpediency is no justification for the action now taken by the majority.'
Despite the vigor of Chief Justice Lewis's dissent in McLeod, the same
court has recently moved even further in the direction of authorizing police
prosecution of criminal cases. In 1992, the court rejected specific proposals
submitted by a special subcommittee of the Unauthorized Practice of Law
Committee of the South Carolina Bar, explicitly "reaffirm[ing] the rule that police
officers may prosecute traffic offenses in magistrate's court and in municipal
court."' 56 Further, in case there were any doubts about what limiting effect might
have been created by the court's use of the phrase "traffic offenses," the court
issued an opinion just two months later that upheld a misdemeanor shoplifting
conviction that had been prosecuted before a jury by a private security officer.'57 In
that case, the court explicitly held that "the prosecutorial authority granted to law
enforcement officers and licensed security guards applies with equal force to non-

151.
Id. (Lewis, J., dissenting). Interestingly, Justice Lewis had joined the
majority opinion in State v. Messervy, 187 S.E.2d 524 (S.C. 1972), just six years earlier. His
dissent did not explain the reasoning behind his vote in the earlier case.
152.
Id.
153.
Id.
154.
Id. at 320.
155.
Id.
156.
In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules, 422 S.E.2d 123, 125 (S.C. 1992).
157.
Easley v. Cartee, 424 S.E.2d 491 (S.C. 1992).
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within the jurisdiction of a magistrate's or municipal
traffic 15misdemeanors
8
court.

The court-sanctioned use of police officers as prosecutors in criminal
cases has an even longer history of explicit court approval in New Hampshire. In
1953, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire specifically approved the practice of
police prosecution in State v. Urban.5 9 Although New Hampshire did not have a
specific statute prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law, it did have a statute
that made it unlawful for a police officer to "'appear in any court or before a justice
as attorney for any party in a suit."''' The court noted that although no court had
ever decided whether this statute was intended to preclude police officers from
prosecuting criminal cases, there were a number of published New Hampshire
cases in which passing reference had been made without negative comment to
police prosecution. Furthermore, the court pointed out that similar statutes in
Maine, Massachusetts, and Vermont had not been found to preclude police
prosecution of criminal cases. 62 Concluding that the legislature intended only to
prohibit police officers from appearing as attorneys in civil matters, the court held
that "in prosecuting a misdemeanor in a municipal court a police officer 63is not
acting 'as attorney for any party in a suit' within the meaning of the statute."'
In the years since Urban was decided, the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire has had several opportunities to revisit the issue of police prosecution,
each time upholding the practice. In State v. LaPalme, the court affirmed a
misdemeanor conviction for cruelty to animals that had been secured by a police
prosecutor, noting only that "[t]he prosecution of misdemeanors by police officers
is a practice that has continued in one form or another since 1791 and is still
permissible under existing statutes."'' In State v. Morin, a virtual case study in
some of the hazards of police prosecution, the court affirmed a drunk driving
conviction in which the police prosecutor had badly mishandled the case at trial. In
that case, in a trial before a judge, the police prosecutor had tried to prove the
defendant's operation of the motor vehicle exclusively through the use of hearsay
evidence; when that evidence was not allowed, the police prosecutor rested without
providing any competent evidence that the defendant had operated a motor
vehicle.'65 Although the evidence that the prosecutor had presented was clearly
legally insufficient to support a conviction, the judge "on his own motion ordered a
continuance" in order for the police prosecutor to secure the evidence necessary for
his case. 66 A new witness was presented on the date of the continuance and the
158.
159.
160.
STAT. ANN.

161.
162.
163.
STAT. ANN.

164.
165.
166.

Id. at 492 n.2.
100 A.2d 897 (N.H. 1953).
Id. at 897 (quoting N.H. REv. L. ch. 380, § 23 (current version at N.H. Rv.
§ 104:25 (1996)).
Urban, 100 A.2d at 898.
Id.
Id. at 898 (quoting N.H. REV.L. ch. 380, § 23 (current version at N.H. REv.

§ 104:25 (1996)).
179 A.2d 284,285 (N.H. 1962).
327 A.2d 702 (N.H. 1974).
Id.
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days in jail, pay a substantial
defendant was convicted and sentenced to serve thirty
67
fine, and lose his license to drive for three years.'
Although the majority opinion in Morin affirmed the conviction, a
vigorous dissent argued that "the unsolicited intervention by the court after the
prosecution had rested, designed to generate evidence which would permit a
conviction, was impermissible."' 68 The dissent pointed out that the independence of
a criminal trial court is compromised any time it "assist[s] in the preparation or
presentation of the prosecution's case, either ex parte or in court."' 69 The dissent,
quoting Learned Hand, concluded that the judge in the case before the court had
"'exhibited a prosecutor's zeal, inconsistent with that detachment and aloofness70
which courts have again and again demanded, particularly in criminal trials.""
Because he was "persuaded that an ordinary person in the position of [the]
defendant would feel that the combined prosecution by the prosecutor and the court
was unjust,"'' the dissenting justice would have overturned the conviction.
Perhaps because of the recurrence of the problems that arose in Morin, the
court's next opinion addressing the issue of police prosecution, State v. Aberizk,' 72
challenged the wisdom of the practice of police prosecution. The court cited
Standard 3-2.1 of the American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice,
which recommends that "[t]he prosecution function should be performed by a
public prosecutor who is a lawyer subject to the standards of professional conduct
and discipline.' ' 173 The court then cited Morin in support of the proposition that
"[t]he absence of an independent, professional prosecutor may reduce pre-trial
screening of charges, lead to greater involvement of the trial court in eliciting
evidence, and restrict counsel's opportunity to object to the admission of
evidence."' 74 The court went on to suggest that "[i]mprovements in the challenged
procedure [would be] a desirable subject for legislative consideration in the
framework of available time, education, and budgetary resources.' 17' Nonetheless,
the court affirmed the drunk 76driving conviction that had resulted from a trial
prosecuted by a police officer.
Despite the court's fairly strong language, it made clear in a decision
published almost a decade later that the practice of police prosecution continued
unabated in New Hampshire and that the court was not inclined to bring it to a halt.
In Bilodeau v. Antal, the court was called upon to rule on the contours of the
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 702-03.
Id. at 703 (Griffith, J., dissenting).
Id. (citing AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
FUNCriON OFTHETRiALJUDGE, Standard 6.4 (1st ed. 1972)).
170.
Morin, 327 A.2d at 703 (quoting United States v. Marzano, 149 F.2d 923,
926 (2d Cir. 1945) (Learned Hand, J.)).
171.
Id. at 703-04.
172.
345 A.2d 407 (N.H. 1975).
173.
A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-2.1.
174.
State v. Aberizk, 345 A.2d at 408. See also Morin, 327 A.2d 702.
175.
Aberizk, 345 A.2d at 408.
176.
Id.
177.
455 A.2d 1037 (N.H. 1983).
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state's prohibition of the unauthorized practice of law. In dicta, the court
"reaffirm[ed] the right of law enforcement officers to prosecute criminal cases on
behalf of the State." ' Curiously, the court's very next sentence and paragraph held
that a medical expert who is not a licensed attorney must be barred from examining
and cross-examining witnesses in a medical malpractice deposition, relying on the
following logic:
Lawyers alone are uniquely knowledgeable about the procedural
and evidentiary law of our State, in addition to the substantive law
of the case at hand. Perhaps more important, lawyers are subject to
discipline, and may be sued privately if their performance falls
below the level of reasonable care and diligence. We see no reason
why trial counsel cannot refer a complex medical- malpractice case
a case, or take the
to a lawyer who is competent to handle such
79
requisite time to master the medical details.
The court made no effort to reconcile its prohibition of the practice of law by a
medical expert with its continued approval of allowing police officers to practice
law, despite the fact that the reasoning supporting the prohibition would seem to
apply with far greater force in the context of a criminal prosecution and trial.
In only two other states do there appear to be any court opinions dealing
with the propriety of police prosecution of criminal cases. In contrast to South
Carolina and New Hampshire, however, the opinions originate from lower courts
and have little precedential value in terms of justifying the practice. In New York,
there are several published opinions from the 1930s that address the issue,80 each
of which suggested that the practice of police prosecution was firmly in place at
that time, but only one of which actually condoned the practice. In People v.
Black, '' a 1935 New York County Court decision, the court upheld a criminal
conviction that had been obtained by an inspector from the state's Conservation
Department, despite the defendant's contention that the conviction was void
because the prosecutor was not licensed to practice law. As the court noted, the
relevant statute "contain[ed] a positive and proper prohibition for 'any natural
person to practice or appear as an attorney-at-law.. .for another in a court of
record... without having first been duly and regularly licensed to practice law in the
courts of record in this state.""'8.2 The court concluded that "[tihe clear and only
178.
Id. at 1041 (citing Aberizk, 345 A.2d at 408 (N.H. 1975) and State v.
LaPalme, 179 A.2d 284, 285 (N.H. 1962)).
Id. (citations omitted).
179.
180.
See, e.g., People v. Black, 282 N.Y.S. 197, 199 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 1935)
(affirming misdemeanor conviction secured by conservation department inspector
prosecutor, noting the "long-established practice of presentation of minor criminal cases
before justices of the peace by Conservation Department inspectors, state troopers, and
other public officers"); People v. Wood, 272 N.Y.S. 258 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 1934) (vacating
misdemeanor criminal conviction because sheriff who prosecuted the case was not licensed
to practice law); People v. James, 269 N.Y.S. 626 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 1934) (vacating
misdemeanor conviction because district game inspector who prosecuted the case not
licensed to practice law).
181.
282 N.Y.S. 197 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 1935).
Id. at 200 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAw § 270).
182.
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permissible intent of the Legislature was to protect the general public from
exploitation at the hands of unscrupulous or unskilled persons posing as lawyers, or
unauthorized persons demanding or receiving compensation for purely legal
service.' 8 3 Finding that the prosecutor in the case was a state employee who
neither held himself out to be an attorney nor received any special compensation
for acting in his capacity as a prosecutor, the court reasoned that the policies
supporting the statute did not require that the conviction be reversed. 1" After
acknowledging that the statute was "clear in its phrasing,"' 85 the court held that
enforcing the statute with its literal interpretation would result in "'such
unreasonable, unjust, or absurd consequences as to compel a conviction that they
could not have been intended by the legislature."" 86 For that reason, the court
does not violate
concluded that a law enforcement officer who acts as a prosecutor
7
the prohibition against practicing law without a license.'1
One passage from the court's opinion in Black makes the court's
misperception of the relevant issue particularly clear:
Who was hurt? Can the defendant appellant complain because he
was not prosecuted by a more experienced and skilled person?
Going before a layman justice, may he be heard on the mere ground
that the case against him was presented by another layman, when he
was ably represented by an admitted attorney of high standing?'8"
The court completely failed to recognize that a defendant relies heavily upon the
ethics and competence of a prosecutor for the protection of his most basic
constitutional rights.' 89 Even if one assumes that the layperson is operating in
completely good faith, there are a whole host of ways in which vital rights can be
undermined by an unskilled prosecutor. 9° These problems are exaggerated, not
reduced, when the judge presiding over the case is not a licensed attorney, as there
is even less oversight provided for the protection of the defendant's rights. The
court was equally dismissive of the obvious risk that the public was harmed by the
practice of allowing unskilled laypersons to prosecute criminal matters, stating only
that "[the prosecutor's] employer, the state, does not and cannot be heard to
complain of his acts."'' The notion that the executive branch of the state, by
endorsing what on its face clearly constituted a violation of a state statute, could
somehow waive the right of the public to seek the protection of the laws passed by
its own legislature, seems bizarre at best.
Several much more recent court opinions, while not directly ruling on the
issue of police prosecution, make it abundantly clear that the practice has continued
183.
184.
185.

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.
Id. at 200-01.
Id. at 201.
Id. (quoting 25 RuLING CASE LAW § 214 at 959).
Id.
Id.
See supra PartII.
See supra Part II.
Black, 282 N.Y.S. at 200-01.
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right through to the 1990s. In 1989, a New York trial court noted the "'longestablished and accepted procedure and practice of over a century,' which 'today
has the force of law,' to have the prosecution of misdemeanors and offenses in
lower courts 'conducted by local authorities, that is, by the police, State
troopers...town and village attorneys and corporation counsels."' 192 Similarly, the
Second Circuit noted in 1992 the "long-standing tradition of lay prosecutions for
'
The unauthorized practice of law is
misdemeanor offenses in New York."193
expressly prohibited by statute in New York,' 94 and neither the legislature nor any
higher court has ever suggested that police officers were exempt from the statute's
provisions.
In Delaware, where police prosecution of misdemeanors appears to be
pervasive,' 95 this author's research produced only one court opinion touching on
the subject. In Evans v. Barron,'96 in the context of deciding a case involving a
speeding ticket, a judge of the Delaware Superior Court upheld the power of the
state police to prosecute traffic offenses in Justice of the Peace Courts. There, the
court confirmed the "well-established practice of the State Police in prosecuting
traffic offenders in the Justice of the Peace Courts."' 197 Nonetheless, "[n]either [the]
petitioner nor the State proffer[ed] any finding or persuasive authority to authorize
or preclude the police conduct in issue.' '198 In light of "the absence of any authority
to the contrary,"' 99 the court upheld the practice, although it specifically limited its
decision to offenses "contained in the Motor Vehicle Code or [within] the
jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court." 2' By statute, the jurisdiction of the
Justice of the Peace Courts includes forty-six specific misdemeanor offenses, many
of them punishable by up to one year in jail,2"' and the Motor Vehicle Code also
appears to contain several criminal offenses. 2' The judge in this case did not
address the fact that the Supreme Court of Delaware has expressly held that it has
the "exclusive right to license attorneys at law" and that "presuming to practice law
without a license is a contempt of [the court's] authority and punishable as such.""2 3
People v. Jackson, 548 N.Y.S.2d 987, 991 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989), rev'd, 558
192.
N.Y.S.2d 590 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal denied, 566 N.E.2d 1177 (N.Y. 1990) (quoting In
re Johnson v. Boldman, 203 N.Y.S.2d 760, 761-62 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960) and People v.
Wyner, 142 N.Y.S.2d 393, 396 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 1955)).
193.
Linares v. Senkowski, 964 F.2d 1295, 1298 (2d Cir. 1992).
N.Y. JuD. LAw § 484 (West 1997). Two Opinions issued by the state's
194.
Attorney General suggest that a police officer who prosecutes a criminal case is not engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law under this statute. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. 166; 1933 Op.
Att'y Gen. 111.
195.
Telephone Interview with Captain Thomas DiNetta, Delaware Police
Academy (June 20, 1997).
No. 81A-AU-7 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982) (on file with author).
196.
Id.
at4.
197.
Id.
198.
Id.
199.
Id.
at 4 n.5.
200.
See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2702,4206 (1995).
201.
See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 21, §§ 4172(a), 4601, 4604 (1997).
202.
203.
Delaware Optometric Corp. v. Sherwood, 128 A.2d 812, 816-17 (Del.
1957).
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This case has very little precedential value and is simply further evidence of the
fact that police prosecution in Delaware is widespread, without any legal support or
justification for the practice.
In the federal court system, there are only three published cases in which
the practice of police prosecution has been subjected to judicial scrutiny. Although
the court in each instance upheld the validity of the resulting criminal conviction,
the cases contain very little cogent legal analysis. In United States v. Glover,2" the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland upheld a larceny
conviction that resulted from a trial at which the prosecutor was an Air Force
officer who was not licensed to practice law. The court acknowledged that the local
court rules required one to be licensed to practice law in order to practice before
the court, but noted that the practice of police prosecution had "long had the tacit
approval of all of the Judges of th[e] Court.""2 5 The court then engaged in a review
of the trial transcript, concluding that the police prosecutor "thoroughly prepared
his case [and] conducted himself quite ably" and that the defendant "received a fair
trial."2" By suggesting without further analysis that the trial was "fair," the court
simply assumed the conclusion of what should have been the central legal issue in
the case-whether a trial can ever be fair when every discretionary decision that
preceded it and every discretionary decision made during the trial itself is made by
a prosecutor who is not licensed to practice law. The court's opinion is devoid of
any exploration of the myriad ways in which the case might have been affected by
the decisions that the police prosecutor made outside of judicial review. For
example, a dry review of a trial transcript tells an appellate court precious little
about plea offers that a prosecuting attorney might have made, exculpatory
evidence that a police prosecutor may not have disclosed, or a conflict of interest
that the police prosecutor might have had in prosecuting the case. Significantly,
although it upheld the underlying conviction, the Glover court expressed some
reservations about the practice of police prosecution. The court concluded its
opinion by noting that "justice, and its appearance, would be better served if the
United States Attorney's Offices were sufficiently enlarged and funded to permit
and require their participation as prosecutors in criminal proceedings before
Federal Magistrates." 2°7
The two other federal court opinions on point offer even less legal
analysis than the Glover opinion. In United States v. Broers,23 the Ninth Circuit
declared without any analysis whatsoever that the prosecution of a misdemeanor
case by a federal agent who is not licensed to practice law "does not in and of itself
implicate due process." 2' The court's per curiam opinion simply cited Glover for
its dismissive legal conclusion and affinmed the misdemeanor conviction that was

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

381 F. Supp. 1139 (D. Md. 1974).
Id. at 1143.
Id. at 1146.
Id.
776 F.2d 1424 (9th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1425.
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the result of a trial conducted by a special agent of the United States Forest Service
who was not licensed to practice law.210
Under essentially the same set of facts, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of California in United States v. Downin21, simply cited Broers
for the otherwise unjustified proposition that "the use of a lay prosecutor in a petty
'
That court went on to
offense case does not inherently violate due process."212
acknowledge, however, that the practice might violate the local court rule requiring
admission to the bar in order to practice. In a truly extraordinary footnote, the court
stated that the "historic reason for the local rule, namely, this court's reliance on
the State Bar of California for discipline of members of its bar, suggests that the
local rule is irrelevant to any interest of the defendants. 21 3 It is hard to comprehend
how being prosecuted for a crime by an individual who is not subject to any form
of ethical rules or professional discipline cannot be a legitimate concern for the
defendant. As the history and caselaw surrounding unauthorized practice rules
elsewhere make clear,214 the rules are designed to protect all members of society,
not just the purported client, from the unscrupulous and incompetent practitioner.
B. StatutoryAuthority for Police Prosecution
There are three states in which the legislature appears to have given its
approval, either explicitly or tacitly, to the prosecution of criminal cases by police
officers. In Massachusetts, the legislature has seen fit to acknowledge, but not
explicitly authorize, the widespread practice of allowing police officers to
prosecute criminal cases. Rule 2(b)(13) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that the term "prosecutor" as used within the rules "means any
prosecuting attorney or prosecuting officer, and shall include a city solicitor, a
police prosecutor, or a law student approved for practice pursuant to and acting as
authorized by the rules of the Supreme Judicial Court. 215 The commentary
suggests that this broad definition "reflects the fact that many cases in the District
Courts are prosecuted by a police prosecutor."21 6 While this rule does, in fact,
reflect the reality of the common practice in Massachusetts, it does not appear to
make the practice legal. By statute, the unauthorized practice of law is a
misdemeanor criminal offense in Massachusetts,217 and neither the legislature nor
any published court opinion has exempted police officers from the scope of that
statute. The state's highest court, the Supreme Judicial Court, has twice
acknowledged the pervasiveness of police prosecution in the state, but in neither
case did it explicitly rule on the legality of the practice. In a 1980 opinion, Furtado
v. Furtado,"' the court noted in passing that "[p]olice prosecutors, who normally
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id.
884 F. Supp. 1474 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
Id. at 1480.
Id. at 1481 n.13.
See infranote 388 and accompanying text.
MAss. R. CRsm. P. 2(b)(13) (1996).
MAss. R. CraM. P. 2(b)(13) cmt (1996).
MAss. GEN. LAws cl. 221, § 41 (1998).
402 N.E.2d 1024 (Mass. 1980).
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are not members of the bar, customarily prosecute offenses, particularly minor
offenses, in the District and Municipal Courts of the Commonwealth. ' 1 9 The court,
after citing the definition of the term "prosecutor" found in Rule 2(b)(13) of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, went on to suggest in dicta that "certain criminal
proceedings may be prosecuted by a person who is not a member of the bar."' °
Just a few months later, in Burlington v. District Attorney for the Northern

District,"2 the court noted that "it has long been assumed, and reflected in actual
practice, that a district attorney, to the extent that his appearance in criminal cases
in District Court is discretionary with him, may elect to leave such prosecutions to
local police officers designated by the particular police command of the
municipality."' 2 In neither case did the court address the question of whether a
police officer who prosecutes is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
In Maine, the statute that prohibits the unauthorized practice of law, in
conjunction with a related statute, expressly authorizes police officers to "represent
[a] municipality in District Court in the prosecution of alleged violations of
ordinances which the officer may enforce."' Because ordinances in Maine can be
either criminal or civil in nature, 4 the statute provides explicit legislative authority
for police officers to prosecute criminal cases.'
In Iowa, the statute that outlines the duties of the county attorney
specifically requires the county attorney to prosecute all misdemeanors involving
domestic abuse.

6

The statute then provides that the county attorney "shall

prosecute other misdemeanors when not otherwise engaged in the performance of
other official duties." 7 Although another Iowa statute provides that "the power to
admit persons to practice as attorneys and counselors in the courts of [Iowa]... is
vested exclusively in the supreme court,""2 Iowa officials have nonetheless
interpreted the county attorney statute to allow police officers to prosecute
misdemeanor cases when the county attorney is "otherwise engaged." 9

219.
Id. at 1034.
220.
Id.
412 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1980).
221.
Id. at 333-34 (citing KENT B. SMrrH, CRIMNAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
222.
§ 850 (1970)).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 2671(3) (West 1997); ME. Rnv. STAT.
223.
ANN. tit. 4, § 807 (West Supp. 1997).
224.
See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 4-B (West 1997).
225.

In practice, it appears that this authorization is rarely utilized. Telephone

Interview with Alan Hammond, Training Manager, Maine Criminal Justice Academy (July
22, 1997).
226.
IOWA CODE § 331.756(4) (1996).
227.
Id.
IOWA CODE § 602.10101 (1996).
228.
229.
Telephone Interview with Peter Grady, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
the Attorney General of the State of Iowa (June 18, 1997). It is worth noting, however, that
the practice of police prosecution appears to be little used in the state. Id.
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C. Police Prosecution in the Absence of Specific Authority
In as many as half a dozen other states,2o the prosecution of misdemeanor
criminal cases by police officers who are not licensed to practice law appears to
occur without any reference to the practice in any published court opinion or any
statute or rule promulgated by the state's legislature. In some of these states, such
as Rhode Island,"3 Pennsylvania,"s2 and New Jersey,"I the practice apparently
occurs on a daily basis. In others, the practice may be far less frequent.'

230.
There is some basis for asserting that police officers prosecute criminal cases
in the following jurisdictions beyond those already referenced in the text of this Article:
Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Virginia.
See infra notes 231-34 and accompanying text.
231.
As the Director of the Roger Williams University Criminal Defense Clinic,
which represents misdemeanor defendants in the District Courts of Rhode Island, this
author can verify through personal experience that police prosecution is a daily and
pervasive practice in the state. While police officers do not represent the state at the trial
stage, they routinely engage in plea negotiations and every stage of representation up until
the trial. In many cities and towns, an attorney will never see a case unless all efforts at
resolution prior to trial have failed.
232.
In a law review article published in 1988, Professor Seth F. Kreimer noted
that "police officers initially prosecute many misdemeanor complaints" in Allegheny
County, Pennsylvania. Seth F. Kreimer, Releases, Redress, and Police Misconduct:
Reflections on Agreements to Waive Civil Rights Actions in Exchange for Dismissal of

Criminal Charges, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 851, 884 (1988). He went on to cite an interview
with the Executive Director of the Greater Pittsburgh Chapter of the ACLU for proposition
that "in misdemeanor cases, the initial prosecution is undertaken by the police officers." Id.
at 884 n.128 (citing interview with James Lieber conducted on June 30, 1987).
Id. at 884 n.129 (citing WnLAM B. LrrrRELL, CONSTRUCTING CRIME: PO~ICE
233.
AND PROSECUTOR'S MANAGEMENT OF THE CHARGING PROCESS 25 (1974) (Ph.D. dissertation)

for the proposition that "misdemeanor cases [are] presented in New Jersey by municipal
prosecutors or police officers").
234.
In New Mexico, it appears that police officers prosecute misdemeanor cases
in some of the lower trial courts. Telephone Interview with Al Rackstrew, Director,
Criminal Prosecutions Division, Office of the Attorney General of the State of New Mexico
(June 25, 1997). In Virginia, the practice is reportedly allowed by some judges in the lower
courts but not by others. Telephone Interview with James Hopper, Assistant Attorney
General, Office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Virginia (June 27, 1997).
There is also some evidence that the practice occurs or has occurred in Minnesota and
Vermont. See KIeimer, supra note 232, at 884 n.129 (citing Rachel N. Doan, Case Study of
a Management Innovation in a Misdemeanor Court, in MISDEMEANOR

COURTS,

supra note

6, at 160, 162, for the proposition that the "availability of prosecution services in Minnesota
misdemeanor courts is limited"); State v. Urban, 100 A.2d 897, 898 (N.H. 1953)
(suggesting that police officers prosecute criminal cases in Vermont). But see Telephone
Interview with Julio Barone, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General of
the State of Minnesota (June 20, 1997) (indicating that the only police officers allowed to
prosecute criminal cases are those who are licensed to practice law); Telephone Interview
with Cindy Maguire, Legal Counsel to the Department of Public Safety, State of Vermont
(June 27, 1997) (indicating that police officers do not prosecute criminal cases).
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IV. POTENTIAL DEFENSE CHALLENGES TO POLICE PROSECUTION
A defendant who is convicted of a criminal offense in a prosecution
conducted in part or in full by a police officer who is not licensed to practice law
may be able to challenge the validity of that conviction. There are two primary
arguments that a defendant can plausibly advance in this context. First, an
argument can be made under the common law in most jurisdictions that the
conviction, secured as it was by the unauthorized practice of law, is simply void.
Second, an argument can be made that the defendant has been deprived of due
process of law by being prosecuted by a layperson, and in particular by being
prosecuted by a police officer who may well have had a conflict of interest in
prosecuting the case.
A. A Conviction Resulting from the Unauthorized Practice of Law is Void
There is significant authority to support the contention that a conviction
that is secured through a prosecution by someone who is not licensed to practice
law may be held to be void for that reason alone. In the context of civil litigation,
any number of states have held that the unauthorized practice of law serves to void
or nullify any legal proceedings conducted by that party. 5 Of the few courts that
have directly considered the question in the context of a criminal prosecution, most
have held the same way. In South Carolina and New Hampshire, the two
jurisdictions in which the highest courts have explicitly approved of police
prosecution, the courts have done so by finding that a police officer who prosecutes
a criminal case somehow is not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, 236 a
finding that defies both common sense and straightforward legal analysis. In only a
small handful of exceptional cases have courts upheld criminal convictions secured
by a prosecutor who was explicitly acknowledged to have been engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law.
In a case that dealt squarely with the issue at hand, a county court in New
York held in People v. James 7 that the prosecution of a criminal case by a law
enforcement officer constituted the unauthorized practice of law, thereby rendering
the defendant's criminal conviction after a trial by jury void as a matter of law. 8
The defendant in that case stood accused of criminally possessing a racoon in
violation of the state's game laws and was prosecuted by a district game inspector
who had not been admitted to practice law. In the course of voiding the resulting
conviction, the court noted that its finding that the prohibition of the unauthorized
practice of law applied to law enforcement officers was not only required by the
canons of statutory construction, but was also "salutary":

235.
See Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Right of Party Litigant to Defend or
Counterclaimon Groundthat Opposing Partyor His Attorney Is Engaged in Unauthorized
Practiceof Law, 7 A.L.R.4th 1146, § 4(a) (1981), and cases cited therein.
236.
See supra notes 135-79 and accompanying text.
237.
269 N.Y.S. 626 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 1934).
238.
Id. at 630.
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The officer who makes the investigation, lays the information,
procures the issuance of the warrant, and makes the arrest of the
person accused of the crime, should not be allowed to act as
prosecuting attorney. No argument is needed that allowing a person
to act as investigator, complainant, arresting officer, principal
witness, and prosecuting attorney, does not tend to promote
justice.... [NIothing should be done to violate the spirit and express
provision of the Constitution and statute guaranteeing a man
accused of a crime a fair and impartial trial. This cannot be done if
too much power and too many functions
are vested in or permitted
239
to be exercised by the arresting officer.
Citing several cases that considered the ramifications of the unauthorized practice
of law in the civil context, the court held that "where a trial is conducted by a
person,,24°who is forbidden to conduct the trial of the same it renders the judgment
void.
Two other New York courts have held precisely the same way, voiding a
criminal conviction that resulted from the unauthorized practice of law by a law
enforcement officer. In People v. Wood,24' the court voided a criminal conviction
that resulted from a jury trial in which the county sheriff acted as the prosecutor.
The court there found that the sheriff "actively conducted the trial of the issue
before the Justice Court and jury" despite the fact that "he was prohibited and
forbidden to conduct the same by the provisions of...the Penal Law" that
criminalized the unauthorized practice of law.24 2 Consequently, the court held that
"the judgment rendered in this case was and is void, if for no other reason." 4 3
Similarly, in People v. O'Neil,'"the court held that it was "improper" for a trial
judge to allow the arresting officer in a criminal case to cross-examine a witness,
thereby functioning as a prosecutor.245 The court found that it was in violation of
239.
Id. at 629.
240.
Id. at 630 (citing Puma v. McConigle 132 N.Y.S. 242 (N.Y. City Ct. 1911);
Kaplan v. Berman, 75 N.Y.S. 1002 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1902); Newburger v. Campbell, 58 How.
Pr. 313 (N.Y. C.P. 1880)). Curiously, despite its strong declaration that one person should
not act as "investigator, complainant, arresting officer, principal witness, and prosecuting
attorney," id. at 629, the court stated in dicta that it would actually allow such a practice.
Noting that a party "has a right to act as attorney on his own behalf," the court stated that
had the arresting officer in the case, rather than the district game inspector, acted as
prosecutor, the court "would [have] be[en] constrained to hold that he was not violating the
provisions" of the statute that prohibits the unauthorized practice of law. Id. at 630. The
court suggested that the arresting officer, "being the complainant, would have a right to
conduct the prosecution in his own behalf." Id. Of course, this position relies on an
extraordinarily basic misapprehension of the nature of a criminal proceeding, in which the
prosecution is conducted on behalf of the citizenry, not an individual complainant.
241.
272 N.Y.S. 258 (Cty. Ct. 1934).
242.
Id. at 263-64.
243.
Id. at 264. Much like the court in James, although far less explicitly, the
court suggested in dicta that its holding might have been different if that arresting officer,
who it inaptly labeled the "complainant," had prosecuted the case directly. Id. at 263.
244.
248 N.Y.S. 674 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1931).
245.
Id. at 676.
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state law for the judge to "permit any one not a lawyer to exercise such privilege,
unless he is a party defendant, when he is within his right to examine and crossexamine witnesses." 2 6
Ironically, a decision issued by the Supreme Court of South Carolina, a
court that has explicitly endorsed the practice of police prosecution, further
supports the proposition that a conviction secured by the unauthorized practice of
law should be declared void. In State v. Sossamon, 7 the court reversed a
conviction that was tried for the prosecution by a police officer who was neither the
arresting officer nor a supervisor of the arresting officers. Because the court's prior
decisions on the subject had authorized prosecutions only by the arresting officer
and his or her supervisor, the court reversed the conviction, presumably because
the state was represented at trial by a police officer who was engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law.248
Moving beyond the narrow arena of cases involving prosecutions
conducted by law enforcement officers, there is further support for the notion that a
conviction secured by an unauthorized prosecutor-is void. In People v. Jackson,249
a New York trial court set aside a jury's verdict when it was revealed that the
assistant district attorney who prosecuted the case had never passed a bar
examination and, therefore, had never been duly licensed to practice law." 0 The
court's well-reasoned and thorough opinion was reversed on appeal in a dismissive
paragraph, in which the Appellate Division found that while the unauthorized
practice of law in that context was "improper," the "procedural irregularity [was]
insufficient to constitute reversible error" absent proof of prejudice to the
defendant."' Nonetheless, the trial court's opinion is worthy of note in support of
the proposition that the unauthorized practice of law renders a criminal prosecution
void. The court summarized the underlying theme of several of the New York
cases when it noted as follows: "Where the court permits a conviction to remain in
force where.. .illegality [is] used to obtain it, the court can only be deemed to be a
partner in such.. .illegality. The court therefore adopts the per se rule that a felony
conviction obtained by a nonlawyer prosecutor must be vacated without regard to
prejudice." 2
Similarly, the highest courts in Illinois and Wisconsin have voided
criminal convictions that were secured by prosecutors who were unauthorized to
practice in their respective states. In People v. Munson," 3 the Supreme Court of
Illinois reversed a conviction for robbery, quashing an indictment because the
prosecutor who had presented the case to the grand jury was not licensed to
246.
Id. at 677.
247.
378 S.E.2d 259 (S.C. 1989).
248.
Id. at 259.
249.
548 N.Y.S.2d 987 (Sup. Ct. 1989), rev'd, 558 N.Y.S.2d 590 (App. Div.
1990).
250.
Id. at 995.
251.
People v. Jackson, 558 N.Y.S.2d 590, 590 (App. Div. 1990), rev'g 548
N.Y.S.2d 987 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
252.
People v. Jackson, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 995.
253.
150 N.E. 280 (II. 1925).
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practice law. While the case was decided on the grounds of the unauthorized grand
jury presentation, the court explicitly stated that its holding with respect to the
prosecutor's authority to appear before the grand jury "likewise applie[d] to his
participation on the trial of the cause." 4 The court continued that "[t]he statute
prohibiting the practice of law by one who is not licensed is to be observed in fact
as well as in theory, and the fact that there may be associated in the trial of the case
other persons actually licensed to practice law in nowise validates the participation
of one not so authorized." 25
In State v. Russell 6 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed a first
degree murder conviction because the case was prosecuted by a man who, while "a
distinguished criminal lawyer" in another jurisdiction, was not licensed to practice
law in Wisconsin. 57 The court acknowledged that "foreign counsel [could], by
special favor, be permitted to appear for his clients in [Wisconsin] courts."
Nonetheless, the court held that foreign counsel could not be licensed "to assist in
discharging the duties and performing the functions of the office of the district
attorney" because the State of Wisconsin "is not his client." 8 Because the state
was represented by a prosecutor who was not duly licensed, the court summarily
reversed the conviction, noting that the defendant "ought not to have been
compelled to submit to such a trial." 9 The court continued: "She has suffered all
the terrible consequences of an illegal trial and conviction for murder in the first
degree. She was, of course, prejudiced by it. The error is material. ''2 6
There is, as noted, a very small group of published cases that uphold a
criminal conviction on appeal after explicitly recognizing that the conviction was
secured through the unauthorized practice of law. All of these cases stem from the
acts of one particular prosecutor, Daniel J.Penofsky, an Assistant District Attorney
in Brooklyn, New York, who had never passed a bar examination but who
managed to masquerade as a licensed attorney for at least fourteen years. In People
26
v. Carter,
1the New York Court of Appeals had its last word on this issue, holding
that the mere fact of the prosecutor's unauthorized practice of law, without a
showing of some specific form of prejudice, was not sufficient to justify
overturning the convictions before the court. In a federal habeas corpus challenge
to two convictions secured by Mr. Penofsky, premised on the argument that the
Id. at 283.
254.
Id.
255.
53 N.W. 441 (Wis. 1892).
256.
Id.
257.
Id. at 442.
258.
Id. at 443.
259.
Id. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Young v. United States ex rel
260.
concurring), also lends credence to the
Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S. 787 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
argument that the prosecution of a criminal case by one who is not authorized to do so, even
if a licensed attorney, renders the ensuing conviction void. In that case, Justice Scalia
opined that the trial court's appointment of special prosecutors was without legal authority
and, therefore, void. Id. at 815. Justice Scalia then concluded that, "since we cannot know
whether [the defendants] would have been prosecuted had the matter been referred to a
proper prosecuting authority, the convictions are likewise void." Id.
566 N.E.2d 119 (N.Y. 1990).
261.
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prosecutions by a layman violated due process, then United States District Court
Judge Louis J. Freeh held precisely the same way,2 62 as did several lower state
court opinions, some pre-dating the Carteropinion2 63 and some post-dating it.264 It
is important to note, however, that neither the Court of Appeals opinion in Carter
nor the federal court decision directly addressed the question of whether the
illegality involved in the prosecution of the cases rendered the convictions void.
While some of the lower state court opinions are less than clear, it seems that few,
if any, directly considered the possibility that a common law rule might require a
finding that the convictions are void. It is also worth noting that at least two lower
state court opinions and a vigorous dissent in Carter presented quite different
views, each supporting the proposition that the actions of a prosecutor who is
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law must be deemed void.265
The situation faced by the New York courts in addressing the numerous
cases involving Mr. Penofsky's unauthorized practice of law presented a very
difficult set of facts for the courts. Any ruling that concluded that his unlawful
practice of law rendered a conviction void would have set in motion a barrage of
litigation. As a prosecutor in a very busy district attorney's office for more than a
decade, it is probable that he participated in thousands of cases and well over one
hundred trials. No doubt that fact weighed heavily on each of the courts that
addressed the issue. Judge Freeh was quite explicit in discussing this aspect of his
decision:
We also cannot ignore the practical implications of accepting
petitioners' due process claim-every defendant convicted by
Penofsky during his fourteen-year tenure as a prosecutor would be
entitled to a new trial. Petitioners have not demonstrated a sufficient
basis for invalidating such a large number of cases and have not

262.
Munoz v. Keane, 777 F. Supp. 282, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd sub nom
Linares v. Senkowski, 964 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1992).
263.
See People v. Jackson, 558 N.Y.S.2d 590 (App. Div. 1990), rev'g 548
N.Y.S.2d 987 (Sup. Ct. 1989); People v. Reyes, 554 N.Y.S.2d 587 (App. Div. 1990);
People v. Linares, 550 N.Y.S.2d 703 (App. Div. 1990); People v. Munoz, 550 N.Y.S.2d
691 (App. Div.).
264.
See People v. Rohena, 584 N.Y.S.2d 100 (App. Div. 1992); People v.
Rohena, 581 N.Y.S.2d 66 (App. Div. 1992).
265.
See People v. Carter, 566 N.E.2d 119, 124-25 (N.Y. 1990) (Titone, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the court's decision "makes a mockery of...the rules prohibiting
legal practice by laypersons" and "lead[s] to the absurd conclusion that those charged with
the duty of enforcing the criminal laws may, in the process, break them"); People v.
Jackson, 548 N.Y.S.2d 987, 995 (Sup. Ct. 1989), rev'd, 558 N.Y.S.2d 590 (App. Div.
1990) (holding that a conviction secured by the unauthorized practice of law was void
because to "permit[] a conviction to remain in force where fraud and illegality are used to
obtain it" makes the court "a partner in such fraud and illegality"); People v. Greenfield,
543 N.Y.S.2d 864, 866 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (holding that the state could not "rely on the
arguably criminal conduct" of an unlicensed prosecutor who signed a declaration of
readiness for trial and that the signed document was void).
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proposed
suggested any way to limit the scope of their
2
constitutional rule. Accordingly, we decline to adopt it. 6
While understandable as a practical consideration, it is clear that the duration and
extent of Mr. Penofsky's unlawful practice served to distort the legal analysis in
each of these cases, and that a more honest approach to the problem would lead in
only one direction: the conclusion that illegality on the part of the state cannot be
countenanced or relied upon for the benefit of the state, and the acts of a person
engaged in the crime of practicing law without a license must render the
consequences of those acts void.
B. Criminal Prosecution by a Police Officer Violates Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "No State shall.. .deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.",26' While many of the modem Supreme Court decisions concerning
the due process clause concern the application of other rights specifically
enunciated elsewhere in the Constitution,268 it is clear that the due process clause
stands on its own in establishing the right to procedural fairness in a criminal case.
269
Although the right to due process is often described as the right to a "fair trial,
any number of decisions by the Supreme Court reflect the fact that a defendant is
entitled to due process throughout a criminal proceeding, not just at the trial
stage.Y At its core, the due process clause assures a criminal defendant that the
process applied to his or her case will be fundamentally fair. Because the vast
majority of a prosecutor's discretionary decisions are made at the early stages of
the process, beyond the ability or willingness of the judicial process to review,271
the fair functioning of the criminal justice system relies largely upon assumptions
about the integrity and competence of those who prosecute.272 The licensing
266.
Munoz v. Keane, 777 F. Supp. 282, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd sub nom
Linares v. Senkowski, 964 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1992).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
267.
268.
For example, the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
enunciated in the Fourth Amendment, the right to remain silent enunciated in the Fifth
Amendment, and the right to counsel and the right to a public trial enunciated in the Sixth
Amendment.
See, e.g.; Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (1997); Withrow v. Larkin, 421
269.
U.S. 35, 46 (1975); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (recognizing
270.
defendant's right to due process at pre-trial detention hearing); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972) (recognizing defendant's right to due process at parole revocation hearing);
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (recognizing defendant's right to due process
in plea bargaining). See also Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 406 (1942) (reversing a
conviction stemming from an indictment handed down by a grand jury that had been
constituted by a racially discriminatory selection process because the Court's duty is "to see
to it that throughout the procedure for bringing [a defendant] to justice he shall enjoy the
protection which the Constitution guarantees").
271.
See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
In holding that prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability under
272.
42 U.S.C. § 1983, the United States Supreme Court relied heavily on the fact that "a
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procedures employed by the various states provide the underpinnings for those
assumptions, assuring that a prosecuting attorney possesses some minimum level of
competence, at least no clear evidence of suspect ethics or morals, and a stated
willingness to abide by ethical constraints. If a prosecutor is not duly licensed to
practice law, the presumption that a prosecutor has handled a criminal case
competently and ethically is completely unfounded and unsupportable. The next
section of this Article will maintain that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the prosecution of a criminal case by a police officer who is
not licensed to practice law.
1. Due Process Cases
Only four published court opinions appear to have directly considered the
question of whether a defendant has a due process right to be prosecuted by a
licensed attorney. Two of these opinions arose from Daniel J. Penofsky's
unauthorized practice of law in New YorkY 3 The eventual revelation of Mr.
Penofsky's fraud and of his actual status as a layperson produced a spate of
litigation, resulting in several opinions from the New York state courts as well as
opinions from the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit.274 While
these opinions addressed a series of issues related to Mr. Penofsky's unadmitted
status, only two-one from the New York Court of Appeals
and one from the
275
Southern District-squarely addressed the due process issue.

prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among officials whose acts could deprive persons of
constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional discipline by an association of his
peers." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976). The Court held out the amenability
to discipline, in conjunction with the extraordinarily unlikely scenario of a prosecutor
facing criminal charges for intentionally violating a defendant's constitutional rights, as the
"checks" that "insure that prosecutors are mindful of the constitutional rights of persons
accused of crimes." Id. See also Munoz v. Keane, 777 F. Supp. 282, 284 n.7 (S.D.N.Y.
1991), affid sub nom Linares v. Senkowski, 964 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1992).
273.
Munoz, 777 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd sub nom Linares v.
Senkowski, 964 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1992); People v. Carter, 566 N.E.2d 119 (N.Y. 1990).
For a related discussion of the cases involving Mr. Penofsky, see supra notes 263-68 and
accompanying text.
274.
See supra notes 261-66.
275.
See supra note 273. Two other New York state court opinions are worthy of
some mention in this context. One Appellate Division decision, People v. Linares, 550
N.Y.S.2d 703, 703 (App. Div. 1990), after noting that the defendant claimed a denial of due
process, declared only that "since defendant was not prejudiced, there was no reversible
error." Thus, it is unclear whether that court conducted any analysis of the due process
claim. In addition, one trial court decision concerning Mr. Penofsky, later reversed on
appeal, held that the prosecution of a felony case must be conducted by a licensed attorney.
People v. Jackson, 548 N.Y.S.2d 987 (Sup. Ct. 1989), rev'd, 558 N.Y.S.2d 590 (App. Div.
1990). It is not clear from that court's decision, however, whether it ever reached the due
process question; indeed, it seems much more likely based on the wording of the opinion
that the court's decision was rooted in statutory and common law doctrine.
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276
the New York Court of Appeals dispensed with the
In People v. Carter,
due process argument in a rather summary fashion, providing no significant legal
analysis and little clarity about the extent of its holding on the due process issue.
The court noted that the defendants in each of the cases in the consolidated appeal
"should have been prosecuted.. .by an Assistant District Attorney who was duly
admitted to practice,"' at least in part because of the "undeniably broad discretion
vested in public prosecutors and the extent of their control 'over individuals'
liberty and reputation.""'278 Nonetheless, the court relied heavily on the fact that it
was provided with "no authority for the proposition that a defendant has a due
process right to be prosecuted by a duly admitted attorney."279 With no further
discussion, the court held that, "in the absence of [a showing of] prejudice, the fact
that Penofsky was not a lawyer did not result in a deprivation of defendant's
constitutional due process rights."' In so holding, it appears that the court never
squarely decided whether or not there is a due process right to be prosecuted by an
attorney; rather, the court held only that if such a right exists, its violation is
harmless error absent an explicit showing of prejudice.

The Southern District of New York, under essentially the same facts,
decided the due process issue much more directly, holding in Munoz v. Keane..
that it "decline[d] to adopf 22 what it had termed "a new constitutional right-the
right to be prosecuted by a licensed attorney."2 3 Much like the Court of Appeals
opinion in Carter,the Southern District opinion relied heavily on the fact that such
a constitutional right had never been specifically articulated in any prior case.2
Unlike the Court of Appeals, however, the Southern District conducted some
independent analysis of the underlying claim. The court's analysis, however, was
deeply flawed in its reliance on two quite questionable propositions.
First, the court flatly asserted that "a criminal defendant does not rely on a
'
This rather startling proposition is all the more
prosecutor to protect his rights."285
extraordinary because the court quoted the United States Supreme Court only two
pages earlier in its opinion as follows: "'It is as much [a prosecutor's] duty to
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is
to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.' 286 In a wide variety of
settings, including pre-trial discovery, plea negotiations, and jury selection, a
criminal defendant is forced to rely quite heavily on the ethical and constitutional
276.
566 N.E.2d 119 (N.Y. 1990).
Id. at 123.
277.
Id. at 124 (quoting People v. Zimmer, 414 N.E.2d 705, 707 (N.Y. 1980)).
278.
Id. at 123.
279.
Id. at 124.
280.
777 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd sub nom Linares v. Senkowski, 964
281.
F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1992).
282.
Id. at 286.
283.
Id. at 285.
Id.
284.
'285.
Id. at 286.
Id. at 284-85 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935))
286.
(alteration in original).
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obligations on a prosecutor to "seek justice, not only a conviction." 2 w Exculpatory
evidence in the hands of a prosecutor will generally find its way to a criminal
defendant if and only if the prosecutor obeys his or her ethical and constitutional
duties in the face of any number of competing interests. A plea negotiation is
founded upon the fact that the defense can rely on factual representations made by
a prosecutor who is faithful to his or her constitutionally and ethically prescribed
role. In jury selection, a prosecutor is ethically and constitutionally obliged not to
use improper factors to exclude potential jurors. In each of these areas, and in
countless others throughout the criminal process, a defendant must rely on the good
faith of the prosecutor to protect his or her rights. The court's assertion that
"defense counsel and an impartial trial judge are capable of monitoring the
prosecutor's conduct in order to ensure that no constitutional violations occur" 288 is
not only inconsistent with the conclusion that has been reached by the United
States Supreme Court,2 89 but also simply incorrect.
Second, the court asserted that there are significant "checks" on
prosecutorial misconduct beyond the professional disciplinary process.2' The court
asserted that 'Penofsky, like all prosecutors, had to be aware that were he to abuse
his power and violate a defendant's constitutional rights, the conviction would
likely be overturned either on direct appeal or by collateral attack. 29 ' In fact,
prosecutors are aware of quite the opposite; the likelihood of a criminal conviction
being overturned, even in the face of an error on the record of constitutional
magnitude, is remote. The vast majority of such constitutional errors are subject to
a harmless error analysis on appeal, the death knell to most criminal appeals. 2' The
287.
Id. at 286. See also A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17,
Standard 3-1.2(c).
288.
Munoz, 777 F. Supp. at 286.
289.
See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S. 787, 807 (1987).
290.
Munoz, 777 F. Supp. at 285 n.8.
291.
Id. The court also asserted somewhat cryptically that "all the normal
constitutional protections applicable to criminal prosecution [were] in effect" in the cases
before the court. Id. By "normal," one can assume that the court meant to refer to other
more clearly identifiable constitutional rights, such as the right to counsel and the right to a
trial by jury. Any number of other constitutional rights, such as the right to be provided with
exculpatory evidence in the possession of the state and the right to be tried by a jury that is
not selected on the basis of race, are entirely dependent on the good faith of the prosecutor.
Whether or not those protections were "in effect" in these cases seems to be the very
question that the court was asked to resolve. How the fact that certain of the defendants'
constitutional rights were observed operated as a "check" on prosecutorial misconduct that
could have occurred beyond the scope of the record is certainly hard to discern. The court's
assertion also seems to overlook the fact that being prosecuted by a licensed attorney is
certainly the "normal" state of affairs in a criminal case.
292.
Justice Stevens has expressed his concern that the Supreme Court's "broad
presumption in favor of harmless error.. .has a corrosive impact on the administration of
justice." Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 588 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring). He has stated
that the "automatic application of harmiess-error review in case after case, and for error
after error, can only encourage prosecutors to subordinate the interest in respecting the
Constitution to the ever-present and always powerful interest in obtaining a conviction in a
particular case." Id. at 588-89.
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error of constitutional magnitude that appears on the record, however, is only one
small category of the potential ethical and constitutional violations that an
unscrupulous or incompetent prosecutor may create; a far more likely scenario is
the one in which the constitutional or ethical violation never surfaces at all,
therefore remaining entirely immune from judicial review. Because the judicial
system offers a defendant precious little protection from an unethical prosecutor,
the only real check on prosecutorial misconduct is the attorney's ethical and moral
commitment to obey the law. 3
Relying on these two faulty premises, and emphasizing "the practical
implications" of recognizing a due process right to be prosecuted by a licensed
attorney-granting a new trial to "every defendant convicted by Penofsky during
his fourteen-year tenure as a prosecutor"-the court held that there was no such
right.294 The court then went on to note in dicta that, even if there were such a due
process right, the violation of that right would be subject to harmless error analysis
5
because it "does not qualify as a 'structural defect.. .[in] the trial mechanism."'"
As noted below, this conclusion, which the court reached without any analysis in its
opinion, is as flawed as the court's holding.
The two other published opinions that directly address the due process
implications of a prosecution conducted by a non-attorney each offer even less
legal analysis. In United States v. Broers,296 the Ninth Circuit declared without any
analysis whatsoever that the prosecution of a misdemeanor case by a federal agent
who is not licensed to practice law "does not in and of itself implicate due
process." 2" In that case, the court affirmed a misdemeanor conviction that resulted
from a trial conducted by a special agent of the United States Forest Service who
was not licensed to practice law.298 The court's per curiam'opinion supported its
dismissive legal conclusion with nothing more than a simple citation to United
States v. Glover,299 an earlier case from the District of Maryland. Because the
Glover court had not conducted a due process analysis, however, the citation offers
little explanation or support for the court's holding.
Similarly, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California in United States v. Downin3°° upheld a misdemeanor conviction in the
face of a due process attack on a prosecution conducted by an unlicensed federal
agent. That court simply cited Broers for the otherwise unsupported proposition
that "the use of a lay prosecutor in a petty offense case does not inherently violate
due process.' 3 1' The court also indicated that, because there was "no suggestion on
See supra note 83.
293.
Munoz, 777 F. Supp. at 286.
294.
Id. at 286 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991))
295.
(alteration in original).
776 F.2d 1424 (9th Cir. 1985).
296.
Id. at 1425.
297.
Id.
298.
381 F. Supp. 1139 (D. Md. 1974). For a fuller discussion of this case, see
299.
supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
884 F. Supp. 1474 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
300.
Id. at 1480.
301.
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the record that the outcome of the trial was affected by the alleged error," any error
"must be considered harmless." 3" This declaration seriously underestimates the
vast areas of discretionary power that a criminal prosecutor exercises that are
outside the scope of any judicial review.
2. ProperDue ProcessAnalysis: Establishinga ConstitutionalError
In light of the novelty of the issue, a well-reasoned and thoughtful analysis
of the due process right to be prosecuted by a licensed attorney would necessarily
involve an analysis of several different but analogous lines of cases. From these
lines of cases, some basic propositions can be gleaned that provide a firm
underpinning for the due process argument. First, the cornerstone of the
constitutional guarantee of due process is the requirement that a person who is
accused of a crime is entitled to a process that is fundamentally fair. The notion
that the criminal justice system has operated fairly in any given case rests almost
exclusively on the presumption of regularity that attaches to a prosecutor's actions;
indeed, as many courts have made clear, the system must operate in this fashion
due to the myriad of unreviewable discretionary decisions that a prosecutor makes
in the course of a prosecution. For that reason, a criminal defendant generally faces
the difficult burden of proving that some part of the process was fundamentally
unfair. Simple logic would suggest that a presumption of regularity cannot apply
when there is no assurance that the prosecutor has ever expressed the willingness
and ability to abide by ethical rules or that the prosecutor has any legal training or
competence whatsoever.
Second, a number of cases stand for the proposition that a person who is
accused of a crime is entitled to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion,
particularly at the charging stage. While a prosecutor's exercise of that discretion is
virtually unreviewable, the complete failure to exercise discretion or the inability to
exercise it impartially have been held to be in violation of due process. If the
person acting as prosecutor is making decisions without the guidance and
restrictions provided by an attorney's ethical rules, or if he or she is making
decisions without proper legal training, the accused is deprived of the fair exercise
of discretion that an attorney would provide.
Third, a number of Supreme Court cases firmly establish that due process
of law requires not only that the process be fundamentally fair, but also that it have
the appearance of fairness. One significant and widely recognized function of the
criminal justice system is to assure the public that it is being protected fairly and
justly; any procedure that fundamentally undermines that function will not survive
constitutional scrutiny on due process grounds. The prosecution of a criminal case
by a person who is not admitted to practice law creates the appearance of
lawlessness; the prosecution of a criminal case by a police officer, particularly by
the officer who made the arrest, creates the appearance of a police state. The
delegation of the prosecution of a criminal case to a non-lawyer undermines the

302.

Id. at 1481.
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public's faith in the integrity of the criminal justice system in violation of due
process of law.
a. Fundamental Fairness and the Presumption of Regularity
In United States v. Armstrong,"° the Supreme Court made explicit a
general rule that courts have consistently followed when issues arise concerning the
prosecution of a criminal case: that prosecutors' decisions are supported by a
"'presumption of regularity' such that "'in the absence of any clear evidence to
the contrary, courts [should] presume that they have properly discharged their
official duties."' 3 4 In Armstrong, which involved a claim of selective prosecution,
the Court stressed the need for broad judicial deference to prosecutorial judgments.
Because it wished to avoid judicial interference with the proper exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, the Court held that a defendant must present clear
evidence of a violation "[i]n order to dispel the presumption that a prosecutor has
not violated equal protection.""3 5
The leading Supreme Court case in the area of prosecutorial conflicts of
interest, Young v. United States ex reL Vuitton et Fils,3°6 emphasizes the great faith
that the criminal justice system places in a prosecutor to exercise his or her
discretion both ethically and constitutionally. That faith involves two components:
competence to exercise discretion and ethical standards by which to do so. In
Young, the trial court had appointed a private attorney with a clear conflict of
interest to prosecute a criminal case. The private attorney in the case represented
Louis Vuitton, a leather goods manufacturer, which was the beneficiary of a civil
injunction that prevented the defendants from infringing Vuitton's registered
trademark.3' The criminal charges, prosecuted by Vuitton's attorney, alleged that
the defendants were in criminal contempt for violating that injunction. 3" Although
the case produced several distinct opinions, the Court overwhelmingly condemned
the practice of appointing counsel for an interested party to prosecute a criminal

517 U.S. 456 (1996).
303.
Id. at 464 (quoting United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14304.
15 (1926)). Other recent Supreme Court decisions have strongly suggested the same rule.
See, e.g., United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 210 (1995) ("'in the absence of clear
evidence to the contrary, courts presume that [public officers] have properly discharged
their official duties"') (quoting United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 1415 (1926)); Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 397 (1987) ("tradition and
experience justify our belief that the great majority of prosecutors will be faithful to their
duty"); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986) (plurality opinion) (discussing
"presumption of regularity" that attaches to the actions of a grand jury).
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 467.
305.
481 U.S. 787 (1987). Perhaps it should be noted here, in the interests of full
306.
disclosure, that the author participated as a clinical law student in drafting a petition for
certiorarito the United States Supreme Court on behalf of a defendant in this case.
Id. at 790-91.
307.
Id. at 791-92.
308.
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contempto and, relying on its supervisory authority over criminal contempt
proceedings, permanently prohibited the practice."
The main problem with the appointment of an interested prosecutor, as the
Court pointed out, is that judicial supervision alone cannot sufficiently detect
whether a prosecutor has violated his or her ethical and constitutional duties.
A prosecutor exercises considerable discretion in matters such as the
determination of which persons should be targets of investigation,
what methods of investigation should be used, what information
will be sought as evidence, which persons should be charged with
what offenses, which persons should be utilized as witnesses,
whether to enter into plea bargains and the terms on which they will
be established, and whether any individuals should be granted
immunity. These decisions, critical to the conduct of a prosecution,
are all made outside the supervision of the court."
Having noted that the vast majority of prosecutorial decisions occur beyond the
scope ofjudicial review, the Court highlighted the importance of some independent
assurance that a prosecutor will live up to the high standards of his or her
profession.
Between the private life of the citizen and the public glare of
criminal accusation stands the prosecutor. That state official has the
power to employ the full machinery of the state in scrutinizing any
given individual. Even if a defendant is ultimately acquitted, forced
immersion in criminal investigation and adjudication is a wrenching
disruption of everyday life. For this reason, we must have assurance
that those who would wield this power will be guided solely by their
2
sense of public responsibility for the attainment of justice3
Thus, the Court implicitly held that the presumption of regularity that attaches to
prosecutorial behavior is inappropriate when a prosecutor has a recognized conflict
of interest. Absent that presumption of regularity, a court is in no position to judge
whether or not a prosecutor has abided by the high ethical and constitutional
standards that bind prosecutors in the performance of their public duties. Although
309.
Eight of the nine justices agreed that it was error for the District Court to
have appointed Vuitton's counsel to prosecute. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens concluded that the error was so fundamental that it required the reversal of the
convictions without any inquiry into whether the error may have been harmless. Id. at 80910 (plurality opinion). Justices Powell and O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist, after
finding that the appointment was in error, would have remanded for the lower court to
determine whether the error was harmless. Id. at 825-27 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Scalia concluded that the District Court, as a part of the judicial
branch of government, did not have the power to appoint -a prosecutor and that the
subsequent prosecution and conviction was void. Id. at 815-25 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Only Justice White, who filed a separate dissenting opinion, found "no error, constitutional
or otherwise." Id. at 827 (White, J., dissenting).
310.
Id. at 808-09.
311.
Id. at 807.
312.
Id. at 814.
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the Court of Appeals had found "the evidence offered at trial 'ample' to support the
convictions" and that there was "'[no reason to believe' that the.. .prosecutor in
'
this case acted unethically, 313
the Supreme Court reversed the convictions.
The unavoidable implication of the Court's decision in Young is the
recognition that little more than a presumption that a prosecutor acts competently
and in good faith serves to protect a criminal defendant from the abuse of
prosecutorial power. The Court's heavy reliance on the ethical standards binding
attorneys makes clear that the Court regards those standards as an essential element
of that presumption.314 Unaddressed because of the facts of the case, but equally
applicable, is the notion that some assurance of basic legal competence would
necessarily support that presumption of regularity. Similarly, logic would dictate
that a presumption of regularity and compliance with ethical and constitutional
standards would be totally inapplicable to a situation in which a prosecutor has
never even been licensed to practice law.
A 1980 opinion issued by the New York Court of Appeals, also relating to
a prosecutor with a conflict of interest, suggests the same rule. In People v.
Zimmer,"5 the court reversed several criminal convictions that had been secured by
a prosecutor with a clear conflict of interest. After outlining the extraordinary
breadth of discretion enjoyed by a criminal prosecutor, the court emphasized the
difficulty of determining whether a prosecutorial conflict of interest has infected a
particular prosecution.
It would be simplistic.. .to think of the impact of a prosecutor's
conflict of interest merely in terms of explicit instances of abuse.
Even [a] thumbnail description of prosecutorial power is enough to
indicate that resulting prejudice can at least as easily flow from an
act of omission as from one of 31
commission,
from discretion
6
withheld as from discretion exercised.
Because of the "practical impossibility of establishing that the conflict has worked
to [the] defendant's disadvantage, 31 and based on a finding that "any presumption
318
of impartiality tends to be undermined when there is a clear conflict of interest,,
the court reversed the conviction. Although the court did not specify whether its
holding was required by the due process clause, the court did note that the issues in
the case involved the "defendant's entitlement to fundamental fairness 319 and were

313.
Id. at 827 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting United States ex reL Vuitton Fils
v. Klayminc, 780 F.2d 179, 185 (2d Cir. 1985)).
314.
See also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976) (noting the central
importance of a prosecutor's "amenability to professional discipline" in assuring that a
prosecutor will be "mindful of the constitutional rights of persons accused of crime").
315.
414 N.E.2d 705 (N.Y. 1980).
316.
Id. at 707.
317.
Id.
318.
Id.
319.
Id. at 706.
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replete with "due process implications."32 The clear implication of the court's
holding is that there is little but a presumption of prosecutorial regularity to assure
the fair and just administration of the criminal process, and that anything that
seriously undermines that presumption may well require reversal on due process
grounds.
The very genesis of the presumption of regularity in the prosecution of
criminal cases would seem to lie in the requirement that a prosecuting attorney
must be licensed to practice law in the jurisdiction in which he or she has been
"
' In those
elected. Indeed, there is a long history of cases holding to that effect.32
cases in which such a requirement has been questioned or challenged, the courts
have stressed the extraordinary level of discretion vested in the public prosecutor
and the potential hazards of trusting a non-attorney to fill that post. The reasoning
behind the holdings in each of these cases suggests that the presumption that a
prosecutor has performed his or her duties ethically and constitutionally requires
that the prosecutor be a licensed attorney.
In one of the most recent of these cases, Curry v. Hosely,3 2 the New York
Court of Appeals held that an elected District Attorney must be licensed to practice
law, stressing that, by virtue of his or her "broad 'discretion to investigate, initiate
[and] prosecute' crimes," a District Attorney "may have 'more control over
individuals' liberty and reputation.. .than... any other public official." ' 3' The court
noted that "the word 'attorney' in its commonly understood sense" refers to "an
officer of the court qualified to prosecute and defend legal actions on behalf of
clients, bound by rules and principles of professional ethics and subject to internal
processes of attorney discipline. 32 Moreover, the court cited with approval
American Bar Association Standard for Criminal Justice 3-2.1, which provides that
"[t]he prosecution function should be performed by a.. .lawyer subject to the
standards of professional conduct and discipline." 3" Thus, by emphasizing both
competence and ethical standards, the thrust of the court's opinion was to suggest
that a presumption of regularity may flow only from extrinsic assurances that a
prosecutor is both competently trained and ethically bound.

Similarly, in State ex rel. Indiana v. Moritz,32 6 the Supreme Court of
Indiana held that the respondent, although he had been elected to the office of
prosecuting attorney, was not permitted to practice law without being duly licensed
to practice. The court there noted that any contrary holding could allow a person
who did not "have any legal education whatsoever" to "represent the State.. .and
Id. at 708. In People v. Benoit, 575 N.Y.S.2d 750, 756-57 (N.Y. Crim. Cc.
320.
1991), a lower court strongly suggested that Zimmer recognized a due process right to be
prosecuted by a disinterested prosecutor.
1950); State ex
321.
See, e.g., People ex rel Elliot v. Benefiel, 91 N.E.2d 427 (ill.
rel. Indiana Bar Ass'n v. Moritz, 191 N.E.2d 21 (Ind. 1963); Curry v. Hosely, 657 N.E.2d
1311 (N.Y. 1995); State ex rel. Summerfield v. Maxwell, 135 S.E.2d 741 (W. Va. 1964).
322.
657 N.E.2d 1311.
Id. at 1312 (quoting Zimmer, 414 N.E.2d at 707) (alteration in original).
323.
Id.
324.
A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-2.1.
325.
326.
191 N.E.2d 21 (Ind. 1963).

1998]

POLICE PROSECUTION

1359

the public interest."32 The court then held that the public "should be protected
against an unqualified person who must exercise discretion based upon legal
knowledge" because "[s]uch a prosecutor could, in his ignorance and lack of
discretion which should be controlled by legal principles, institute unwarranted
'
Again, the strong emphasis on legal training suggests that
criminal proceedings."328
a presumption of regularity in a prosecutor's actions can be supported only when a
legally qualified person is in the position of prosecutor.
It is the prevalence of cases and statutes requiring a prosecutor to be an
attorney that renders the claim that there is a due process right to be prosecuted by
a licensed attorney so novel. While it is clear that the practice of police prosecution
is pervasive in a number of states in this country,329 it is equally clear that the
practice generally extends only to lower level criminal cases, in which a
defendant's incentive and ability to raise constitutional claims is severely
reduced.330 The fact that the prosecutor in any given criminal case is so broadly
presumed to be a licensed attorney lends support to the notion that it is an
elemental part of a fundamentally fair criminal process. As the cases that require
that a public prosecutor be a licensed attorney strongly suggest, it is through the
licensing and disciplinary mechanisms that society is best protected from an
incompetent or unscrupulous prosecutor. Indeed, it is only these mechanisms that
allow the system to operate with a presumption that a prosecutor has exercised his
or her vast and largely unreviewable discretion in an appropriate fashion.
b. The Right to the "Fair Minded Exercise of the Prosecutor's Discretion"
A number of cases have recognized, either explicitly or implicitly, that a
person who is accused of a crime has a right to the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. The clearest elaborations upon this right have come in the context of
cases dealing with a prosecutor who suffers from a conflict of interest. In Gangerv.
Peyton,331 the Fourth Circuit explicitly held that the due process clause prevents the
prosecution of a criminal case by a prosecutor with a conflict of interest. The
prosecutor there represented the defendant's wife in a divorce action at the same
time that he prosecuted the defendant for an assault on the wife. 32 The court held
that the prosecutor's conflict "denied [the defendant] the possibility of [the] fair
'
As the court clearly articulated,
minded exercise of the prosecutor's discretion."333
"not every criminal case goes to trial. Prosecuting attorneys frequently decline to
327.
Id. at 24.
328.
Id. at 25.
329.
See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
330.
In some of the states in which the practice is prevalent, such as Rhode Island
and Delaware, the defendant's entitlement to a de novo trial on appeal renders the litigation
of constitutional issues in the lower trial court virtually impossible. In other jurisdictions, as
the First Circuit noted in Figueroa Ruiz v. Delgado, 359 F.2d 718, 722 (1st Cir. 1966),
many issues will evade appellate review because "the cost of appeal is disproportionate to
the penalty."
331.
379 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967).
332.
Id. at 711.
333.
Id. at 712.
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charge, or nol pros, [c]riminal cases.... Aside from the possibility of a favorable
charge decision, including nol pros, there is always the prospect of plea
bargaining."3" The court highlighted the fact that, due to his conflict of interest, the
prosecutor "was not in a position to exercise fairminded judgment with respect to
(1) whether to decline to prosecute, (2) whether to reduce the charge to a lesser
degree of assault, or (3) whether to recommend a suspended sentence of [sic] other
clemency."33 Because the court "d[id] not know and c[ould] not now ascertain
what would have happened if the prosecuting attorney had been free to exercise the
'
fair discretion which he owed to all persons charged with crime in his court,"336
the
court reversed the conviction as violative of the defendant's due process rights.
Almost two decades later, in Jones v. Richards,337 the Fourth Circuit reconfirmed
its holding in Ganger, emphasizing the "necessity for the fair minded exercise of
the prosecutor's discretion, including his options of whether to seek indictment,
upon what charge, whether to plea bargain, and the possibility of a nol pros. 338
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Young v. United States ex
rel. Vuitton et Fils339 also supports the proposition that a person accused of a crime
has a right to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. In the process of condemning
the appointment of an interested prosecutor, the Court listed some of the ways in
which a conflict of interest might "influence the discharge of [the prosecutor's]
public duty."' Included in that list were decisions concerning who to investigate
and how, whether to offer a plea bargain, and whether to offer immunity in
exchange for testimony against others."4 As the plurality opinion emphasized, "[a]
prosecution contains a myriad of occasions for the exercise of discretion, each of
which goes to shape the record in a case, but few of which are part of the
record." 2
The implication of the Court's decision in Young is that even the ultimate
conviction of a crime before an impartial judge and jury does not serve to cure the
defect of having a prosecutor whose ability to exercise fair discretion has been
undermined. The repeated references to the vast discretion with which prosecutors
are vested, and the specific references to pre-trial decisions concerning
investigation, charging, and plea bargaining, make it clear that the Court was
seeking to protect something more than the right to a fair trial.
A line of cases involving indictments handed down by improperly
constituted grand juries also provides very strong support for the argument that an
accused enjoys a constitutional right to the fair exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Much like a prosecutor, a grand jury is empowered to decide whether or not to
charge an accused with a crime or crimes, and, if so, with what charges. And much
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

Id.
Id. at 712-13 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 714.
776 F.2d 1244 (4th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1246.
481 U.S. 787 (1987).
Id. at 805.
Id. at 805-06.
Id. at 813.
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like those of a prosecutor, the decisions of a grand jury are subject to very limited
judicial review. For that reason, the United States Supreme Court's 1986 decision
in Vasquez v. Hillery, 3 which the plurality opinion in Young cited with
approval, ' is directly relevant to this issue.
In Vasquez, the Supreme Court held that a conviction must be reversed if
it stems from an indictment handed down by a grand jury that was selected in a
racially discriminatory fashion. The Court rejected the notion that a "conviction
after a fair trial.. .purged any taint attributable to the indictment process."' 5 The
holding in the case simply reinforced the holdings of a long list of similar cases
stretching back almost a century, in which the Court had made only vague
references to the fact that an accused might be harmed, focusing more clearly on
the prophylactic value of reversing a conviction obtained after a tainted
indictment.' In Vasquez, however, the Court explicitly discussed the way in which
an accused might be prejudiced by an improperly constituted grand jury, noting
that, "[o]nce having found discrimination in the selection of a grand jury, [the
Court] simply cannot know that the need to indict would have been assessed in the
same way by a grand jury properly constituted."' 7 As Justice Powell explained in
his dissenting opinion in the case:
The Court.. .decide[d] that discrimination in the selection of the
grand jury potentially harmed respondent, because the grand jury is
vested with broad discretion in deciding whether to indict and in
framing the charges, and because it is impossible to know whether
this discretion would have been exercised differently by a properly
selected grand jury.3 8
Thus, inherent in the Court's opinion in Vasquez is the notion that one
who is criminally accused is entitled to the exercise of discretion beyond the level
of whether a charge is supportable by sufficient evidence; were that not the case, a
fair trial would presumably eradicate any potential prejudice that resulted from the
improperly constituted grand jury. As the plurality opinion of the Vasquez Court
noted:
The grand jury does not determine only that probable cause exists to
believe that a defendant committed a crime, or that it does not. In
the hands of the grand jury lies the power to charge a greater offense
or a lesser offense; numerous counts or a single count; and perhaps
most significant of all- a capital offense or a noncapital offense-all
on the basis of the same facts. Moreover, '[tihe grand jury is not
bound to indict in every case where a conviction can be obtained.'
Thus, even if a grand jury's determination of probable cause is
474 U.S. 254 (1986).
343.
Young, 481 U.S. at 813.
344.
345.
Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 260.
346.
See, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S.
282 (1950); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370
(1881).
Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 264.
347.
348.
Id. at 275 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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confirmed in hindsight by a conviction on the indicted offense, that
confirmation in no way suggests that the discrimination did not
impermissibly infect the framing of the indictment and,
consequently, the nature or very existence of the proceedings to
come.
When constitutional error calls into question the
objectivity of those charged with bringing a defendant to judgment,
a reviewing court can neither indulge a presumption of regularity
nor evaluate the resulting harm.349
The underlying premise of the Court's decision, therefore, is that the accused is
entitled to the full and fair exercise of the charging authority's vast discretion, and
that the entitlement to the fair exercise of that discretion has been denied if the
authority exercising the discretion is not properly constituted. A grand jury selected
through a discriminatory process is clearly an improperly constituted charging
authority. Similarly, a prosecutor who is practicing law despite never having been
duly admitted to practice law is an improperly constituted charging authority. Even
a trial and conviction before a judge or jury "in no way suggests" that a
prosecutor's lack of legal training and expertise or lack of ethical guidelines "did
and, consequently, the nature
not impermissibly infect the framing of the [charges]
350
or very existence of the proceedings to come.
Several state court cases have held that a prosecutor must actually
exercise discretion in every individual case, and that the complete failure to
exercise discretion constitutes reversible error. In State v. Pettit,351 for example, the
Supreme Court of Washington vacated a criminal sentence when a prosecutor's
office employed a mandatory policy in which every case that met certain criteria
received precisely the same sentencing recommendation. The court held that the
"fixed formula" constituted "an abuse of the discretionary power lodged in the
prosecuting attorney."352 Noting that it had frequently "recognized the necessity for
the exercise of sound discretion by public officials," the court remanded for
"resentencing based on a recommendation reached through the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. ' '35' Similarly, the Supreme Court of Arizona in State v.
City Court of Tucson354 struck down a prosecutorial office policy requiring all
349.
Id. at 263 (quoting United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 629 (2d Cir.
1979) (Friendly, J., dissenting)). Justice White, who joined in the remainder of the Court's
opinion, without explanation chose not to join in this particular paragraph. See id. at 264
n.6. The three dissenting justices acknowledged that "a different grand jury might have
decided not to indict or to indict for a less serious charge," but stated that the grand jury's
decision to indict was "correct as a matter of law, given respondent's subsequent,
unchallenged conviction." Id. at 277 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissenters maintained that
a defendant "has no right to a grand jury that errs in his favor." Id. Justice O'Connor, who
filed a separate concurring opinion, did not address the issues discussed in this paragraph.
Id. at 266-67 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
350.
Id. at 263.
351.
609 P.2d 1364 (Wash. 1980).
352.
Id. at 1368.
353.
Id.
354.
150 Ariz. 99,722 P.2d 267 (1986).
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prosecutors to move to disqualify a particular judge from all drunk driving cases.
There, the court held that the policy "infringed upon the obligation of each Deputy
City Prosecutor to exercise his or her individual professional judgment on a case
'
by case basis."355
An individual who is prosecuted by a person who is not a licensed
attorney is deprived of the fair minded exercise of discretion by a legally trained
and ethically bound prosecutor at all stages of a criminal prosecution, perhaps most
importantly at the charging stage. The ultimate conviction of a crime by a judge or
jury does not change the obvious fact that the case may not have even proceeded to
trial had a qualified prosecutor been handling the case.
c. The Appearance of Fairness
In Petersv. Kiff,356 the Supreme Court restated the "well established" rule
that due process is denied by circumstances that create even "the appearance of
bias., 3 7 In that case, the Court reversed the conviction of a white defendant who
had been indicted by a grand jury that was selected in a racially discriminatory
fashion. Unlike many of the Court's prior grand jury discrimination cases, which
had relied on an equal protection analysis, Peters was decided strictly on due
process grounds. The Court maintained that "[i]llegal and unconstitutional jury
selection procedures cast doubt on the integrity of the whole judicial process,"
thereby "creat[ing] the appearance of bias in the decision of individual cases. 358
For that reason, the Court was unwilling to engage in a harmless-error analysis,
holding that the due process clause required
the per se reversal of a conviction
39
stemming from such a tainted indictment.
In Rose v. Mitchell,31 the Court offered further support for the proposition
that the Constitution requires both the actuality and the appearance of fairness. The
Court there noted that racial discrimination in the grand jury selection process
"destroys the appearance of justice" and "impairs the confidence of the public in
the administration of justice. ' 36 1Further, the Court posited that:
The harm is not only to the accused, indicted as he is by a jury from
which a segment of the community has been excluded. It is to
society as a whole. "The injury is not limited to the defendantthere is injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the

355.
Id. at 270. See also State v. Cook, 512 P.2d 744, 746 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973),
rev'd on other grounds, 525 P.2d 761 (Wash. 1974) (noting that the "prosecuting attorney
must exercise his independent judgment as to the prosecution or dismissal of a complaint"
and that "legal representation of the state by a particularly qualified person was therefore a
distinct advantage conferred upon [the defendant] by statute").
356.
407 U.S. 493 (1972).
357.
Id. at 502.
358.
Id. at 502-03.
359.
Id. at 504-05.
360.
443 U.S. 545 (1979).
361.
Id. at 555-56.
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community at large, and
to the democratic ideal reflected in the
' 362
processes of our courts.
While the Court reversed the conviction on equal protection grounds, the reasoning
would seem to apply with equal force to a due process analysis of the nature of the
error.
More recently, the plurality opinion in Young v. United States ex rel.
Vuitton et Fils363 expressed the same concepts. The plurality determined that the
appointment of an interested prosecutor violates fundamental fairness simply
because it "creates an appearance of impropriety that diminishes faith in the
fairness of the criminal justice system in general. ' '3' As the justices emphasized, a
prosecutor is "armed with expansive powers and wide-ranging discretion. Public
'
confidence in the disinterested conduct of that official is essential."365
While the
Young Court did not explicitly address the due process ramifications of the
"appearance of impropriety," its reference to the undermining of "the public
perception of the integrity of [the] criminal justice system" as an error that is
"fundamental [in] nature" strongly supports the argument that even the appearance
of injustice violates due process.
The New York Court of Appeals suggested the same in People v.
Zimmer.366 In that case, the court overturned a criminal conviction because the
prosecutor in the case suffered from a conflict of interest. The court stressed the
requirement that prosecutorial responsibilities, "carried out in the name of the State
and under the color of law, be conducted in a manner that foster[s] rather than
discourage[s] public confidence in our government and the system of law to which
it is dedicated."367 In a series of rhetorical questions, the court expounded on the
nature of the problem presented when the prosecutor's qualifications in a given
case are at issue:
[W]hat of the appearance of things? No matter the good faith and
complete integrity of the District Attorney, under these
circumstances what impression could the defendant have had of the
fairness of a prosecution instituted by one with the personal and
financial attachments of this prosecutor? Would it have been
unreasonable for the defendant or others to doubt that the public
officer, whose burden it was to screen the complaint for
frivolousness and, if necessary, guide
its destiny before the Grand
36
Jury, would do so disinterestedly?
The court held that the prosecutor should have recused himself from the
prosecution of the case and, in light of his failure to do so, that the trial court
should have dismissed the indictment. Without explicitly stating that its holding
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

Id. at 556 (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946)).
481 U.S. 787 (1987).
Id. at 811.
Id. at 813.
414 N.E.2d 705 (N.Y. 1980).
Id. at 708.
Id. (citation omitted).
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was required by the due process clause, the court noted that the issues in the case
369
involved the "defendant's entitlement to fundamental fairness" and were replete
'370
with "due process implications.
The prosecution of a criminal case by a person who is neither licensed to
practice law nor bound by any specific code of ethical behavior certainly serves to
undermine the appearance of fairness in the operation of the criminal justice
system. Allowing a criminal prosecution conducted by one who is unqualified and
untrained "destroys the appearance of justice" and "impairs the confidence of the
public in the administration of justice.""37 The situation is worse yet if the
prosecutor is a police officer. Forcing a person who has been arrested by a
particular police department to rely on a member of that same department, often
the arresting officer, to exercise prosecutorial discretion, evaluate the legality of
the police actions in the case, evaluate the legal strength of the prosecution's case,
evaluate the worth of the case in terms of its deterrent value, provide the accused
with exculpatory evidence, and, if necessary, try the case, would certainly cause
most defendants to question the fundamental integrity of the proceedings. For that
reason alone, the practice of allowing a police officer who is not a licensed attorney
to prosecute a criminal case deprives a criminal defendant of due process of law.
3. ProperDue ProcessAnalysis: RequiringAutomatic Reversal
Were a court to decide that the prosecution of a criminal case by a person
who is not licensed to practice law is a violation of due process, that court would
then need to decide whether the error is such that it requires automatic reversal of
the resulting criminal conviction. Using the analysis dictated by the Supreme
37
the court must first decide whether
Court's decision in Arizona v. Fulminante,
the constitutional error is a "trial error," in which case it should be analyzed under
the "harmless error" doctrine, or whether the constitutional error is a "structural
defect[] in the constitution of the trial mechanism," in which case it requires
automatic reversal.373 For the reasons that follow, prosecution by a police officer
falls much more readily into the "structural defect" category.
In trying to make some sense out of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in
this field,374 there appear to be two broad categories in which the Court has held
that a constitutional error is "structural." The first category involves cases in which
the error is such that its impact upon the outcome of the case is inherently
Id. at 706.
369.
Id. at 708.
370.
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555-56 (1979).
371.
499 U.S. 279 (1991).
372.
Id. at 306-10.
373.
Several scholars have made compelling arguments suggesting that the
374.
purported dichotomy between "trial" errors and "structural" errors is illusory and that the
Court's jurisprudence in this area is deeply flawed. See, e.g., David McCord, The
"Trial"/"Structural"ErrorDichotomy: Erroneous,and Not Harmless,45 U. KAN. L. REv.
1401 (1996); Charles L Ogletree, Jr., Comment, Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of
Applying Harmless Errorto Coerced Confessions, 105 HARv. L. RFV. 152 (1991).
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indeterminate. Professors LaFave and Israel have suggested that this aspect is
"[u]ndoubtedly the characteristic of 'structural' defects most frequently mentioned
'
Unlike trial errors, the impact of which can at least
in Supreme Court opinions."375
purportedly be evaluated in the context of the trial record, "the impact of violations
in the structural category could not be measured by reference to the evidence
produced because the violation might well have had a bearing on the failure to
produce other evidence, or to take other actions, that would have been
'
influential."376
The Supreme Court's opinions in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et
Fils2" and Vasquez v. Hiller 3 78 offer very strong support for the proposition that
allowing a police officer to prosecute a criminal case is an error that falls into that
category. The plurality opinion in Young held that a prosecution conducted by a
prosecutor with a conflict of interest was an error that could not be subjected to
harmless error analysis, largely for the reasons just noted. After describing the
appointment of an interested prosecutor as "an error whose effects are
' 9
pervasive,"37
the Court continued:
Such an appointment calls into question, and therefore requires
scrutiny of, the conduct of the entire prosecution, rather than simply
a discrete prosecutorial decision. Determining the effect of this
appointment would thus be extremely difficult. A prosecution
contains a myriad of occasions for the exercise of discretion, each of
which goes to shape the record in a case, but few of which are part
"mo assess the impact of a conflict of interests on
of the record ....
the attorney's options, tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations
would be virtually impossible. Thus, an inquiry into a claim of
harmless error
here would require, unlike most cases, unguided
38
speculation." 0
Similarly, the Court explained its "continued adherence to a rule of mandatory
reversal" in Vasquez by noting the "difficulty of assessing [the] effect on any given
defendant" of discrimination in the grand jury selection process. 38' A police
prosecutor acing as the charging authority, much like a grand jury, and then acting
as prosecutor of those charges, would have a completely indeterminate impact on
the entire criminal proceeding. Any effort to determine from a dry record, after the
fact, how the process might have proceeded had a licensed attorney handled the
case, would involve,
as the Court noted in Young, nothing more than "unguided
382
speculation."
The second category of errors that have been deemed to be "structural"
involve situations in which the interest protected by the constitutional right is
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.

LAFAvE &ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 27.6(c).

Id.
481 U.S. 787 (1987).
474 U.S. 254 (1986).
Young, 481 U.S. at 813.
Id. (quoting Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-91 (1978)).
474 U.S. at 264.
481 U.S. at 813 (quoting Holloway,435 U.S. at 490-91).
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something beyond the truth seeking function of the system, such that "an impact
upon outcome, or the lack thereof, simply is irrelevant to the function of the right
'
The plurality opinion in Young highlighted this factor in reaching its
violated."383
finding that the prosecution of a case by an attorney with a conflict of interest
required automatic reversal:
Mhe appointment of an interested prosecutor creates an appearance
of impropriety that diminishes faith in the fairness of the criminal
justice system in general. The narrow focus of harmless-error
analysis is not sensitive to this underlying concern.... A concern for
actual prejudice in such circumstances misses the point, for what is
at stake is the public perception of the integrity of the criminal
justice system. "Justice must satisfy the appearance of
justice,".. .and a prosecutor with conflicting loyalties presents the,
appearance of precisely the opposite. Society's interest in
disinterested prosecution therefore would not be adequately
protected by harmless-error analysis, for such analysis would
3 84 not be
sensitive to the fundamental nature of the error committed.
Similarly, the Vasquez Court based its requirement of mandatory reversal
on the notion that racial discrimination in the selection of grand jurors strikes at so
fundamental a societal interest in fairness that it "is not amenable to harmless-error
review.' 385 Prosecution of a criminal case by a police officer who is not licensed to
practice law strikes at an equally fundamental societal interest-the public
perception of justice that the Court spoke of in Young, without which the integrity,
legitimacy, and efficacy of the criminal justice system would be severely
undermined.
V. PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS ARISING FROM POLICE
PROSECUTION
There are a variety of ways in which entrusting the vast and unreviewed
power of prosecutorial discretion to a police officer who is not a licensed attorney,
even if one assumes that the majority of prosecuting police officers are legally
competent and will abide by all applicable legal ethics provisions, is simply bad
public policy. First and foremost, the practice of law by an individual who is not
duly licensed to practice in that jurisdiction appears to be unlawful in every state in
this country.386 In the most obvious sense, the prosecution of a criminal case in a
fashion that involves unlawful action by the state engenders tremendous disrespect
for the law. The words of the great Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis ring
just as true today as when he wrote them in 1928:
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government
officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are
383.

384.
(1954)).
385.
386.

LAFAvE & IsRAEL, supra note 1, § 27.6(c).

481 U.S. at 811-12 (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14
474 U.S. at 263-64.
See 7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 30(a) (1980).
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commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the
government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law
scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the
administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to
declare that the government may commit crimes in order to secure
the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible
retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should
resolutely set its face. 3s
The prohibition of the unauthorized practice of law has been justified largely in
terms of protecting the putative client and society at large from the unscrupulous or
incompetent practitioner. Even if an individual could establish that he or she
would act in an ethical and competent fashion, the general prohibition would hold
for the greater good of society.389 It is hard to imagine a context in which more
harm might be done to an individual or to society as a whole than to entrust the
enormous power of the criminal justice system to one who is engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law. Consequently, it is hard to imagine a context in which
the general prohibition should be more rigorously enforced. While any instance in
which the public is left unprotected against the unauthorized practice of law is
certainly cause for concern, it is that much worse when the unlicensed practitioner
387.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
See, e.g., People v. Black, 282 N.Y.S. 197, 200 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 1935)
388.
(prohibition is "to protect the general public from exploitation at the hands of unscrupulous
or unskilled persons posing as lawyers"); Bennie v. Triangle Ranch Co., 216 P. 718, 719
(Colo. 1923) (prohibition is "for the protection of citizens and litigants in the administration
of justice, against the mistakes of the ignorant on the one hand, and the machinations of
unscrupulous persons on the other"); Robb v. Smith, 4 11. 46, 47 (1841) (prohibition is "for
[citizen's or suitor's] protection against the mistakes, the ignorance, and unskillfulness of
pretenders").
389.
A justice of the Appellate Division of New York has expressed this
viewpoint in striking and appropriate language. The majority opinion in People v. Felder,
61 A.D.2d 309 (N.Y. App. 1978), affirmed the convictions of several criminal defendants
who had been represented by a person who, unbeknownst to them, was not licensed to
practice law. In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Hawkins wrote as follows:
I do not believe it is at all germane that this layman may have acted more
or less capably than the most skilled lawyer. Surely, one need not
expound upon the State's concern in licensing the profession of law.
Whether he did so expertly or inexpertly is totally irrelevant. In
licensing, the admitting court or State assures and certifies that the
licensee has met minimal standards of education and character
promulgated and adhered to by his peers over the centuries. I suggest
that if we condone what occurred here, we are rendering a grievous
disservice to the public and, also, denigrating our honorable and learned
pursuit.
Id. at 318 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
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purports to actually represent the public through his or her unlawful activity.
Condoning illegal activity conducted in the name of the state is hard to justify
under any circumstances, but even more so when the state is engaged in the process
of attempting to enforce and engender respect for the criminal laws.
Even if the practice of law by a police officer who is not 'licensed to
practice were not in and of itself unlawful, 3" the public is entitled to be properly
represented in a criminal case. If conduct is deemed to be sufficiently detrimental
to the public welfare that it has been criminalized, the public should expect to be
represented in a prosecution of that conduct by a licensed, competent, and ethically
bound attorney. As the United States Supreme Court noted over thirty-five years
ago in Gideon v. Wainwright,391 "[l]awyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed
essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly society." 3" While the Court's
proclamation did not match the reality of the day, or of today for that matter, it is
hard to dispute the inherent logic of the Court's reasoning: "[t]hat government hires
lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend
are the strongest indications of the wide-spread belief that lawyers in criminal
'
In a case in which the defendant is
courts are necessities, not luxuries."393
represented by counsel, it may be that much more important for the protection of
the public that the government be represented by counsel in order to preserve the
balance of representation. As the Supreme Court stated in Herring v. New York,394
"[tihe very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan
advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the
guilty be convicted and the innocent go free."39 That premise is not fully realized
when the government is not represented by a licensed attorney.
Because virtually every jurisdiction in the country is now served by an
elected public prosecutor,396 the public should expect to be represented not just by
any duly licensed attorney, but by that particular prosecutor or a by licensed
member of his or her staff. Having elected a particular official for representation in
criminal cases, it is remarkable that the public does not actually receive the benefit
There is some support in the case law for the proposition that the prosecution
390.
of a criminal case by a police officer may not constitute the unauthorized practice of law.
These cases tend to rely on narrow readings of the statutes prohibiting unauthorized
practice, justifying a practice that was already firmly rooted in the jurisdiction. See supra
notes 135-79 and accompanying text.
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
391.
Id. at 344.
392.
Id. See also State v. Moritz, 191 N.E.2d 21, 24 (Ind. 1963) (concluding that
393.
because "the enforcement of the criminal law is in the interest of protecting the public," it
"naturally follows that it is [in] the interest of the public to have a competent attorney to
carry out the duties of such an office").
422 U.S. 853 (1975).
394.
Id. at 862. See also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655-56 (1984)
395.
(quoting Herring with approval); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 65 (1972) (Powell,
J., concurring) (noting Justice Powell's "longheld conviction that the adversary system
functions best and most fairly only when all parties are represented by competent counsel").
See Joan E. Jacoby, The American Prosecutor:From'Appointive to Elective
396.
Status, PROSECUTOR, Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 25, 28-29.
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of that official's representation when its interests are so clearly at stake. 3 The
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, particularly at the stage at which the
prosecutor decides whether or not to file a criminal charge, involves the
consideration of a great many factors that have little or nothing to do with the
evidence in the case or with the guilt or innocence of the accused. Frequently, if
not in every case, the prosecutor is required to make public policy determinations
based on the law enforcement priorities of the jurisdiction and notions of
individualized justice.39 In some instances, a prosecutor will determine that a
particular criminal statute should remain totally unenforced because it is outdated,
unimportant, excessively expensive to prosecute, or otherwise unenforceable. 399 In
an individual case, a prosecutor must often balance such diverse factors as a
consideration of the deterrence value of the particular prosecution, whether the
mere act of prosecuting the case will cause undue harm to the offender, the desire
on the part of the alleged victim to forgo the prosecution, and the possibility that
the offender can provide assistance in other law enforcement matters.' These
determinations center not around issues of guilt or innocence or even around issues
of evidence or proof, but rather around issues of pure public policy. As the
American Bar Association's Prosecution Function Standards have made clear, "the
prosecutor acts as a decision maker on a broad policy level.... [T]he character,
quality, and efficiency of the whole system is shaped in great measure by the
manner in which the prosecutor exercises his or her broad discretionary powers."'"
Discussions of prosecutorial power and discretion often refer to the office
of public prosecutor as a quasi-legislative' or quasi-judicial' position. The
position is quasi-legislative in that the prosecutor, by adopting a policy of nonenforcement of a particular statute, can essentially override the legislative body that
enacted that statute. The position is quasi-judicial in that the prosecutor is called
upon to make decisions based on a variety of equitable factors, decisions that will
often be determinative of the outcome of the case. Particularly in a misdemeanor
case, in which there is a very high probability that the case will be resolved by a
negotiated plea regardless of the strength of the evidence,' the very decision to go
397.
See, e.g., People v. Vlasto, 355 N.Y.S.2d 983, 991 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1974)
(asking rhetorically whether, if a criminal defendant is entitled to counsel even in certain
petty offense cases, it "should.. .not equally follow that the People are entitled to be
adequately represented by the counsel they have selected-the district attorney").
398.
See, e.g., LAFAVE &ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 13.2(a); Wayte v. United States,
470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
See, e.g., LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 1, at § 13.2(a).
399.
Id.
400.
A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-1.2 cmt.
401.
See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 54, at 53; NDAA PROSECUTION STANDARDS,
402.
supra note 21, Standards 66-72 cmt.
403.
See, e.g., Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 714 (4th Cir. 1967); A.B.A.
PRosEcurION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-1.2 cmt.
In practice, a weaker case is probably more likely, not less likely, to result in
404.
a negotiated plea. Professor Albert Alschuler has suggested that the strongest pressure to
plead guilty is brought to bear in cases in which the evidence is weak. Alschuler, supra note
54, at 59-60.

1998]

POLICE PROSECUTION

1371

forward with a prosecution is often the determinative decision with respect to the
outcome of the case. As Professor John B. Mitchell has noted, "our system is one
in which guilty pleas routinely follow a charge and, therefore, the decision to
charge is, in many cases, tantamount to conviction." 5
Once it is recognized that the role of the prosecutor, to a rather large
degree, involves making determinations concerning public policy, it becomes
obvious that the duly elected public prosecutor, and not the local police
department, must be in control of the prosecution of criminal cases. The American
Bar Association, in Standard 3-2.1 of its Prosecution Function Standards, has taken
the position that "[t]he prosecution function should be performed by a public
prosecutor who is a lawyer subject to the standards of professional conduct and
The commentary explains that Standard 3-2.1 is "designed to
discipline."'
discourage the practice of police or private prosecution," noting that "[tihe absence
of a trained prosecution official risks abuse or casual and unauthorized
administrative practices and dispositions that are not consonant with our traditions
of justice."' At the heart of the development of the public prosecutor as an elected
position is the notion that "the election of prosecutors at the local level.. .increases
the likelihood that the prosecutor will be responsive to the dominant law
enforcement views and demands of the community." 8 An elected official is
subject to removal from office, at the expiration of his or her term if not before, if
he or she is making policy decisions that are inconsistent with the will of the
405.

John B. Mitchell, The Ethics of the Criminal Defense Attorney-New

Answers to Old Questions, 32 STAN. L. REV. 293, 308 (1980). Professor Mitchell argues
that one of the primary means for discouraging prosecutors from filing charges in cases in
which the evidence is weak is for defense attorneys to routinely take weak cases to trial. Id.
at 308-09.
406.

A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-2.1. Similarly,

the National District Attorneys Association has concluded that "the prosecutor should be a
member of the state's bar in good standing." NDAA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note
21, Standard 3.2.
407.

A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-2.1 cmt. For

reasons that one can only speculate about, the commentary stops short of recommending the
complete abolition of police prosecution. While it recognizes "the desirability of
transferring drunkenness offenses, minor traffic offenses, and similar matters out of the
traditional criminal processes and into some form of administrative process," the
commentary continues by stating that "where this has not yet been done, such matters often
can be prosecuted without the aid of a professional public prosecutor." Id. No effort is made
to explain why this procedure should b'e allowed or how it can be justified, which is
particularly startling when it is so directly contradictory to the plain wording of the
standard.
408.

NDAA PROSECUTION

STANDARDS,

supra note 21, Standard 3 cmt. The

American Bar Association has refrained from taking a position on the election of
prosecutors, noting that "[o]pinion has long been divided on the question of whether the
office of the prosecutor should be appointive or elective." A.B.A. PROSECUTION

supra note 17, Standard 3-2.3 cmt. Some observers have opined that the public
is in a poor position to oversee the actions of a local prosecutor. See, e.g., LaFave, supra
note 20, at 538 (maintaining that "while the local prosecutor is in theory responsible to the
electorate, the public can hardly assess prosecution policies which are kept secret").
STANDARDS,
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public. One of the premises underlying our electoral process is that a political
adversary will explore and expose those activities on the part of an elected official
that will be unpopular with thepelectorate. Consequently, if a public prosecutor
chooses not to prosecute or to be lenient in the prosecution of a particular criminal
offense, that would presumably become an issue for public debate at the next
election. Similarly, if a prosecutor were to devote substantial resources to the
prosecution of a particular criminal offense, that judgment would likewise be
debated at the next election. If these same decisions are made by a police officer,
or even by a police department on a broader scale, it is much harder to envision
those decisions as the subject of public debate in that the electoral process cannot
be relied upon to expose or address the issues. While a mayor or some other
elected official may ultimately be held accountable for the actions of a police
prosecutor, the ability of the public to see and to participate in these public policy
judgments is much farther removed. Although responsiveness to the electorate can
certainly have a distorting and unproductive effect on the prosecutor's role,W it
can also be one of the most significant checks on the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion;410 without such a check, the unbridled power of the office is subject to
extraordinary abuse.
It is also likely that certain categories of cases are treated differently by a
police prosecutor from the way in which they might be treated by a prosecuting
attorney. The most obvious of these categories is the class of crimes directly
involving the police, such as resisting arrest or assault on a police officer. Given
the inclination of police officers to see themselves as a cohesive unit and to
emphasize the importance of preserving the reputation of and respect for the
department,4 ' these cases are likely to be prosecuted far more seriously by a police
prosecutor than by an attorney who may have a broader perspective on the
appropriate use of prosecutorial resources. These cases will generally also raise
issues of conflict of interest, in that they often involve allegations that the arresting
officers were engaged in some level of force or violence. It is not hard to imagine
409.
Professor Alschuler, quoting from the findings of the Wickersham
Commission, maintains that "'[t]he system of prosecutors elected for short terms...is ideally
adapted to misgovernment .... The 'responsibility to the people' contemplated by the system
of frequent elections does not so much require that the work of the prosecutor be carried out
efficiently as that it be carried out conspicuously."' Alschuler, supra note 54, at 106
(quoting NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON

PROSECUTION 15 (1931)). He continues by noting that "'the desire for publicity and the fear

of offending those who control local politics"' distort the proper functioning of the system.
Id.
410.
See Sinclair v. State, 363 A.2d 468 (Md. 1976). The court stated,
"As a general rule, whether [the] State's Attorney does or does not
institute a particular prosecution is a matter which rests in his discretion.
Unless that discretion is grossly abused or such duty compelled by
statute or there is a clear showing that such duty exists,"...his decision is
controlling and he is accountable for it to no one other than the
electorate.
Id. (quoting Brack v. Wells, 40 A.2d 319, 321 (Md. 1944)).
411.
See Sherman, supra note 35, at 14-15.
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that an arresting officer who used force to subdue a defendant might have a
particular interest in the prosecution of that case, and if he or she is not the
prosecuting officer, might have a far easier time exerting influence over a fellow
officer than over a prosecuting attorney.
In the other direction, certain categories of crimes might be prosecuted far
less vigorously by an average police prosecutor than by an attorney. The most
obvious example of this sort of case would be in the realm of domestic violence.
Over the past decade, there has been a very strong movement in state legislatures in
the direction of requiring mandatory arrests in domestic violence situations. 412 In
large part, this movement has been in response to the concern that police officers
were not taking domestic violence situations seriously, opting to tell the alleged
413
abuser to "take a walk" or "cool down" rather than making an arrest.
Undoubtedly, the states that have enacted this sort of legislation have determined
that a mandatory arrest policy, by taking discretion out of police hands, will better
serve to protect the public. Certainly, it would seem that the recognition that police
officers, on average, lack a sufficient understanding of the seriousness of domestic
violence would suggest that the very same officers might not prosecute domestic
violence cases as vigorously as might a prosecuting attorney. Similarly, there is
significant reason to believe that police officers are far less likely than prosecuting
attorneys414to treat drunk driving cases as seriously as might a prosecuting
attorney.

Perhaps the most pervasive justification for allowing the practice of police
prosecution is the notion that it would be difficult or impossible to staff and fund
the prosecution of all criminal cases with a duly licensed prosecuting attorney. This
justification appears in the opinions of the Supreme Courts of South Carolina and
New Hampshire, the only two state high courts that have explicitly authorized
police prosecution. In State v. Messervy,41 5 the Supreme Court of South Carolina
acknowledged that "[i]deally, the State's case would be presented by a prosecuting
412.

See generally ELLEN PENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE TO DoMESTIc

ASSAULT CASES: A GUIDE FOR POLICY DEvELOPMENT (1985); LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN Er
AL., POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EXPERAMENTs AND DILmEmMAs (1992).

413.
See Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent
Effects of Arrests for Domestic Assaults, 49 AM. Soc. Rnv. 261 (1984). See also PENCE,
supra note 414; SHERMAN, supra note 413.
414.
This author's four years of active practice in Rhode Island, where the
misdemeanors in some jurisdictions are prosecuted predominantly by police officers and in
other jurisdictions predominantly or exclusively by prosecuting attorneys, provides
significant anecdotal support for this proposition. Perhaps an explanation can be found in
the notion that most police officers, like most adults in this country, have driven an
automobile after having consumed alcohol; it may be easier for a police officer to see
himself or herself as a drunk driving defendant than as a defendant charged with any other
offense, and it may be harder for a police officer than for a prosecuting attorney to put those
feelings in their proper perspective. Professors Barker and Carter, in the course of their
research into police lying, concluded that police officers may well have a more lenient
attitude in practice toward drunk driving offenses than their departmental official policies
would suggest. See Barker & Carter, supra note 80, at 65.
415.
187 S.E.2d 524 (S.C. 1972).
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attorney," but concluded that the high volume of cases made that scenario
impracticable.416 Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in State v.
Aberizk4 17 was critical of the practice of police prosecution, suggesting that
requiring the appearance of a prosecuting attorney was "a desirable subject for
legislative consideration in the framework of available time, education, and
budgetary resources."4 8 Along the same lines, the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland suggested in United States v. Glover419 that "justice, and
its appearance, would be better served if the United States Attorney's Offices were
sufficiently enlarged and funded to permit and require their participation as
'
prosecutors in criminal proceedings before Federal Magistrates."42
Yet nowhere in
any of these decisions is there any analysis of the resources that would be required,
nor any discussion of how the majority of jurisdictions in the United States manage
to handle their criminal caseloads exclusively with licensed prosecutors.
Ultimately, of course, the question of whether the proper conduct of a criminal
prosecution is of high enough priority to merit funding is a question of public
policy; the notion that such staffing is impracticable or impossible is belied by the
practice in other jurisdictions.
There are several ways to address concerns regarding staffing and
funding. The most obvious is to determine which types of cases are serious enough
or important enough to be prosecuted by licensed prosecuting attorneys; if a
category of cases does not rise to that level of seriousness or importance, it would
seem hard to justify continuing to prosecute those cases as criminal offenses.
Indeed, both the Model Penal Code and the American Bar Association Standards
for Criminal Justice have endorsed the decriminalization of a whole host of lesser
offenses, particularly in the area of disorderly conduct, loitering, and public
drunkenness. 42' Even if a jurisdiction were not prepared to decriminalize certain
lesser offenses, thereby reducing the criminal caseload to manageable levels, it
could make some effort to distinguish between different kinds of offenses
prosecuted within the same court. In South Carolina, for example, the Supreme
Court lumped together misdemeanor offenses with an enormous volume of traffic
4
offenses when it concluded that prosecuting attorney staffing was impracticable. 1
The court did not explore whether grouping the misdemeanor cases onto particular
days was a feasible option. In contrast, the Iowa legislature has seen fit to require
the appearance of a prosecuting attorney in all cases of domestic violence, thereby
distinguishing that category of cases from all other misdemeanor cases, in which
the county attorney's appearance is essentially optional.4 With the exception of
Iowa, all other jurisdictions that allow police prosecution seem to allow the
practice on all misdemeanor cases.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.

Id. at 525.
345 A.2d 407 (N.H. 1975).
Id. at 408.
381 F. Supp. 1139 (D. Md. 1974).
Id. at 1146.
See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 250 & explanatory note (1985); A.B.A.
PROsECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-2.1 cmt.
422.
State v. Messervy, 187 S.E.2d 524, 525 (S.C. 1972).
423.
IOWA CODE § 331.756(4) (1996).
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Those who would defend an economic justification for allowing police
prosecution grossly underestimate two significant factors. First, they underestimate
the significance of a misdemeanor prosecution. Even if the underlying offense is
perceived as relatively trivial, a criminal conviction can, in certain circumstances,
cost a person a job, an apartment in public housing, a professional license, a
driver's license, and, of course, freedom from incarceration. 4U Moreover, there are
a variety of misdemeanors that the public appears to take quite seriously. It is
ironic that perhaps the most obvious of these offenses, domestic violence offenses
and drunk driving offenses, are the two kinds of cases that are most likely to be
undervalued by a police prosecutor as compared with a prosecuting attorney. 42
Second, and perhaps more important, those who would defend an
economic justification for allowing police prosecution underestimate the
significance of the public's perception of the criminal justice system. The lower
courts, in which the practice of police prosecution is prevalent, are the primary
point of contact, if not the only point of contact, that most citizens will ever have
with the criminal justice system. 426 Arthur T. Vanderbilt, the late Chief Justice of

the Supreme Court of New Jersey, repeatedly expressed the viewpoint that the
lower courts are the "most important" courts in the state.427 He explained that
viewpoint as follows:
[lit must be apparent to all who consider the matter that the local
courts of first instance are the very foundation for the enforcement
of the criminal law. On them rests the primary responsibility for the
maintenance of peace in the various communities of the state, for
the safety on our streets and highways, and, most irhportant of all,
for the development of respect for law on the part of our citizenry,
on which in the last analysis all of our democratic institutions
depend.4's

424.
In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 48 & n.l1 (1972) (Powell, J.,
concurring), Justice Powell described a whole host of what he termed "[s]erious
consequences" that can follow from a nisdemeanor conviction. After noting that "[l]osing
one's driver's license is more serious for some individuals than a brief stay in jail," id. at
48, he listed a series of other direct and adverse consequences, including the stigma of a
conviction, forfeiture of public office, disqualification from licensed professions, and the
loss of pension rights. Id. at 48 n.l1. Justice Brennan made the same point in Scott v.
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 380 & n.10 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting), reiterating Justice
Powell's list and adding two items of his own: impeachment of one's testimony in any
future legal proceeding and exclusion from jury duty.
425.
See supra notes 412-14 and accompanying text.
426.
See, e.g., In re Yengo, 371 A.2d 41, 45-47 (N.J. 1977); In re Mattera, 168
A.2d 38, 47 (N.J. 1961); In re Field, 576 P.2d 348, 355 (Or. 1978).
427.
Arthur T. Vanderbilt, The Municipal Court-The Most Important Court in
New Jersey: Its Remarkable Progressand its Unsolved Problems, 10 RuTro.ns L. REv. 647,
650 (1956).

428.
Id. Several state court opinions have expressed the same sentiments. The
New Jersey Supreme Court has written: "It is [in the lower courts] that most citizens have
their sole exposure to the judicial process. The respect they have for the judiciary hinges
upon that exposure." In re Mattera, 168 A.2d at 47. Similarly, the Supreme Court of

1376

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1305

If the public perception is that the proceedings in these courts are not legitimatethat illegal practices will be condoned, that the public prosecutor will not even
bother to appear to protect the public interest-then any notion that the criminal
justice system is legitimate and deserving of respect or pride is severely
undermined.
Thus, even if one embraces the unlikely presumption that all police
prosecutors will act both competently and ethically-a presumption that is
certainly not accurate even when it comes to attorneys-there is a whole host of
reasons that allowing police officers to prosecute criminal cases is simply bad
public policy. The practice appears to be unlawful on its face in most of the
jurisdictions in which it occurs. Even if it were lawful, the delegation of what is
obviously the prosecuting attorney's job involves a wholesale delegation of public
policy decisions from a duly elected public official to persons with no particular
duty to be responsive to the electorate. Furthermore, and most importantly, the
practice engenders disrespect for the criminal justice system.
VI. CONCLUSION
Allowing police officers who are not licensed attorneys to prosecute
criminal cases, a phenomenon that is widespread in the lower courts of a number of
jurisdictions in the country, is a highly problematic practice. While it may seem
superficially harmless to entrust a misdemeanor prosecution to a police officer, this
Article has engaged in an extended exploration into the role of a public prosecutor
in protecting the public, the criminal justice system, and the criminal defendant, to
reveal how entirely inappropriate it is to make that delegation of responsibility. A
prosecutor has enormous and almost entirely unreviewed and unreviewable
discretion in the handling of a criminal case. The proper exercise of that discretion
is dependent upon a number of factors, not the least of which are legal training and
ethical obligations. Indeed, the criminal justice system functions almost entirely on
a presumption that the extraordinary power of the government, as wielded through
a prosecutor, is being applied fairly and justly. That presumption is founded upon
the fact that the prosecutor is an attorney who, having been licensed to practice law
in the jurisdiction, has been fully trained in the law and is bound by the codes of
ethics that govern the conduct of attorneys. The licensing process also assures that
a prosecuting attorney has passed some form of screening with respect to honor
and integrity and that he or she has sworn an obedience to the various codes of
ethics. The fact that a prosecuting attorney is subject to the threat of professional
discipline if he or she violates any of the relevant ethical obligations provides
further assurance that a prosecuting attorney is faithfully executing the duties of his
or her office in a fair and just fashion. When the person who prosecutes a criminal
case is not a licensed attorney, none of these protections or assurances is in place

Oregon has noted: '"The impressions [citizens] receive [in the lower courts] serve to shape
their opinion of the judicial system. We cannot permit that opinion to be anything but one
of confidence and respect."' In re Field, 576 P.2d at 355 (quoting In re Yengo, 371 A.2d at
46).
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and the presumption that prosecutorial discretion is being exercised fairly is
entirely unfounded.
A prosecutor's lack of legal training can have a terribly detrimental effect
on the criminal justice system in a wide variety of ways. The most obvious
problems arise when a case proceeds to trial with a prosecutor who is not
competently trained in trial practice and procedures, the rules of evidence, the
elements of a criminal offense, and the relevant legal defenses. While these are the
most obvious problems, they are almost certainly not the most serious, given the
very small number of criminal cases that proceed to trial. Much more alarming
problems related to legal competence arise at the charging stage, where errors in
either direction-overcharging or undercharging-can completely undermine the
fair functioning of the system. Errors made at the discovery stage or ineffectiveness
at the plea negotiation stage due to lack of legal training can have precisely the
same effect.
The fact that a police prosecutor is not bound by an attorney's code of
ethics or answerable to the disciplinary process for attorneys is perhaps the most
disturbing aspect of the practice of police prosecution. A prosecutor plays a unique
and difficult role in the criminal justice system because he or she is required to
protect the defendant and the integrity of the system at the same time that he or she
must vigorously advocate for the state. The requirement that a prosecutor protect
the defendant and the integrity of the system is enforced almost exclusively through
the ethical obligations placed upon a prosecuting attorney. Because there appear to
be no binding ethical restrictions upon a police prosecutor, there are no assurances
that information conveyed to the defendant or to a court will be complete, accurate,
or truthful. Similarly, there are no assurances that exculpatory information will ever
be conveyed to a defendant. And perhaps most importantly, there are no assurances
that the criminal justice system will not be used or abused to further a police
officer's individual agenda. Obviously, these concerns seriously undermine the fair
functioning of the criminal justice system.
Even if one were to assume that a police officer were as legally competent
as a prosecuting attorney and as obedient to all of a prosecuting attorney's ethical
requirements, several troubling issues still remain. A public prosecutor is a duly
elected official, answerable to the electorate and charged with the responsibility of
prioritizing the use of prosecution resources and determining fairness on an
individualized basis. The elected prosecutor's failure to perform those roles, either
directly or through his or her staff, constitutes an entirely unjustified delegation to a
police department that is not directly accountable in any fashion. Moreover, there
are very serious problems in terms of the appearance of justice in courts in which
police officers serve as prosecutors. When a prosecuting attorney fails to appear to
prosecute a criminal case, a message is being conveyed that the case is not of any
particular importance-certainly not the message that our criminal justice system
ought to be conveying. By allowing a layperson to practice law, an act that is
illegal in every state in the country, the practice condones illegality at the same
time that it purports to be enforcing the law. In addition, by failing to distinguish
between the functions of the police department and the functions of a prosecutor's
office, the practice suggests the existence of a totally unsupervised police state.
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For all of these reasons, this Article has suggested that the practice of
allowing police officers to prosecute criminal cases is terribly misguided. But
worse than that, the practice should render any resulting conviction void and
violates a criminal defendant's constitutional right to due process of law. There is
significant support for the proposition that a conviction must be voided if it results
from the unauthorized practice of law; the cases supporting this proposition rely
predominantly on the notion that the state cannot be seen as a participant in this
form of illegality. In addition, while it is an almost entirely novel legal claim, there
is significant support for the proposition that police prosecution violates due
process in several ways. First, the presumption of regularity that attaches to the
actions of a duly licensed prosecuting attorney cannot be justified in the context of
a police prosecution; as such, there is no basis for believing that the defendant's
due process rights throughout the criminal process have been observed. Second,
the defendant has, by definition, been denied the exercise of a prosecuting
attorney's discretion to which he or she is constitutionally entitled. While a
criminal defendant is not entitled to any particular outcome from the exercise of a
prosecutor's discretion, and while a defendant is not entitled to judicial review of
the exercise of that discretion except in very rare circumstances, a defendant most
certainly is entitled to have that discretion exercised fairly by one who is
authorized to exercise it. Third, the substantial appearance of injustice connected to
the prosecution of a criminal case by a police officer, not a licensed, trained, and
ethically bound attorney, violates due process.
In the end, society would be far better served if the extraordinary power of
the government to charge and criminally prosecute its citizens were entrusted only
to those who are elected to exercise it, legally authorized to exercise it, fully and
appropriately trained to exercise it, and ethically bound to exercise it fairly and
justly. Anything short of that is a betrayal of one of our nation's most firmly held
tenets: that the raw power of the government must be exercised wisely, sparingly,
and judiciously.

